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ABOVE ALL ELSE STOP DIGGING: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW AS A (PARTIAL) CAUSE OF (AND SOLUTION TO)
THE CURRENT HOUSING CRISIS
Darien Shanske*
So many things have gone wrong with our housing market that it is hard to know
where to start. One simple diagnosis is that we invested too much in houses that
were not worth as much as we thought. Looked at in this way, it is relatively easy
to see how innovations like interest-only loans contributed to an over-valuation of
housing. Certain actions of the federal government were and are also clearly prob-
lematic, such as the longstanding tax breaks for home ownership.
This Article looks at state and local government law, and particularly at financ-
ing mechanisms created by state law and used by local governments to subsidize
new development. In essence, local governments issued bonds to build key infra-
structure for new developments, and interest on those bonds were exempt from state
and federal income taxes. This Article maintains that these mechanisms served as
yet another subsidy to the very same kinds of value-destroying housing develop-
ments that were already being over-encouraged in other ways. Just as the current
crisis has rightly led policymakers to reconsider government actions at the federal
level, this crisis should also lead to a similar reevaluation of state and local gov-
ernment law, particularly as it intersects with the federal tax exemption for state
and local bonds.
However, to do this properly, we must first reconsider the central normative justifi-
cation for the current local government landscape. This justification is economic
and consists of the argument that competition among a multitude of local gov-
ernment entities is efficient. This vision of jurisdictional competition is generally
known as the Tiebout model.
This Article makes a series of specific contributions to this rethinking. First, despite
arguments by proponents of the Tiebout model to the contrary, it is demonstrated
that a full-blown Tiebout model does not release governments at various levels, nor
citizens, from making political choices about a just (versus merely efficient) distri-
bution of resources. This is primarily because the legal background rules that set
the terms of the competition also select for different equally efficient sets ofjurisdic-
tions. From this result it follows that these legal background rules ought to be
interrogated as making political choices. A particular type of rule is described in this
Article as a "bundling rule. "A bundling rule operates, for instance, by making a
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certain method of financing schools readily available only to new subdivisions,
thus bundling new schools with new development. By opting to make such a
method available, state governments are in effect choosing to encourage certain
patterns of development. Once this is realized, then there should be no barrier
standing in the way of scrapping bundling rules that encourage sprawl.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Housing Market Primed for Failure
For most of the last decade, the area around Sacramento, Cali-
fornia had one of the fastest growing housing markets in the
country.1 At this point, everyone knows the punch line: this once
booming housing market has since crashed precipitously, with ef-
fects far beyond a few real estate speculators or subprime
borrowers.
We know that the severity of both the boom and bust were by no
means the natural and inevitable result of the business cycle. The
list of responsible human actors is long. The Federal Reserve kept
1. See, e.g., Hans P. Johnson & Joseph M. Hayes, California's Newest Neighborhoods, 5
CAL. COUNTS: POPULATION TRENDS & PROFILES 1, 4-5 (2003) (finding that the Sacramento
Area, with 5.3% of the State's neighborhoods, accounted for 11.2% of the State's new
neighborhoods); Sue McAllister, Housing Inflation Remains in Force, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Sept. 2, 2004, at 1C (Sacramento home prices increased between 17% and 18% from
2003 to 2004).
2. See, e.g., Scott Cendrowski, The 2009 Housing Outlook, FORTUNE, Dec. 22, 2008, at 68
(projecting that Sacramento area real estate will lose another 22% of value in 2009); FED.
Hous. FIN. AGENCY, FOuR-QUARTER PERCENT CHANGE IN FHFA MSA-LEVEL HOUSE PRICE
INDEXES (2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.ofheo.gov/hpicity.aspx (finding that, as of the third quarter of 2008, the Sac-
ramento area had seen home prices decline by about 21% over the previous year);
RFALTYTRAc, FORECLOSURE ACTIVITY INCREASES 81 PERCENT IN 2008 ACCORDING To
REALTYTRAc U.S. FORECLOSURE MARKET REPORT 2 (2009) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://media.modbee.com/smedia/2009/
01/1 5/14/2008_ForeclosureMarketReportfromRealtyTrac.source.prod-affiliate.l l.p
df (Sacramento metropolitan area has ninth highest foreclosure rate in country for
2008); Jim Wasserman, Area Real Estate Market Befuddled the Experts for Years, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Jan. 2, 2009, at BI (observing that the real estate collapse in the area continues to be
worse that projected); Matt Woolsey, America's Most Distressed Housing Markets,
FORBES.COM, Aug. 21, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/21/lifestyle-distressed-
cities-forbeslife-cx mw_0821realestate.html (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform) (listing Sacramento as the second most distressed housing market in
the country).
3. The New York Times has produced an authoritative series on the meltdown called
The Reckoning. Among those called to account are the Federal Reserve, federal politicians,
federal regulators, credit agencies, and federal tax breaks. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj & David
Leonhardt, 1997 Tax Break on Home Sales May Have Helped Inflate Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2008, at Al; Jo Becker et al., White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
21, 2008, at Al; Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES,
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interest rates too low. Several Congresses and two Presidents ad-
vanced excessive deregulation, and, it seems, the regulators
regulated even less than they could have. Various financial players,
such as banks and rating agencies, dramatically underestimated
risks, often responding to perverse short-term incentives. On the
ground, mortgage brokers pushed preposterous loans and con-
sumers all too readily accepted them.
With such a colorful, and still partial, list of villains, one wonders
why one should even bother adding another, but we must because
we cannot fix the problems until we know how we got to where we
are, and where we are is in part a place where we have housing that
will likely never be worth what was invested in it. The villain I will
add to our list is local government law in general, and in particular
certain obscure local government financing mechanisms. How can
this be? The short answer is that local government law has system-
atically subsidized many of the least sustainable aspects of the
housing market and often done so under the guise of rigorous
theory.
I will begin my illustration of this point with an extreme, but not
atypical, example-a golf-course centered gated community out-
side of Sacramento called Serrano, which began construction in
the mid-1990s. 4 Serrano features large-lot zoning, a golf course,
and its own local public schools. It should be noted that golf
Oct. 9, 2008, at Al; Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al; Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Nap-
ping, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at Al; see also Jeff Madrick, How We Were Ruined & What We
Can Do, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Feb. 12, 2009, at 15 (reviewing most current analyses of the
crisis). None of these analyses, nor any other of the many written about the crisis that I know
of, address the role of local government law, much less local public finance.
4. Serrano describes itself as "one of the largest and most prestigious master-planned
communities in Northern California." Serrano FAQs, http://www.serranoeldorado.com/
newhomes-lc.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). I am
assuming that no irony was intended to the extent that Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal.
1976), is the name of the leading California decision that mandated equalized expenditures
on education. Serrano currently has about 3,500 homes and plans for 5,000 in total, with a
minimum price of $500,000. Serrano FAQs, supra. Serrano features a golf course and coun-
try club. Id. Golf course-centered communities have become very popular. See Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REv. 437, 468-69
(2006) ("During the 1990s, golf participation intensified, and the United States saw a rapid
increase in the number of residential golf course developments. By 2000, forty percent of
current golf course construction was residential, and the growth rate of residential golf
courses far outpaced the growth rate for real estate developments in general. In Florida,
which has more golf courses than any other state, as many as fifty-four percent of golf
courses were residential."). In 2001, 1 worked on a similar golf course-centered development
(900 homes) in the Sacramento area that received tax-exempt financing. Official Statement,
Community Facilities District No. 2001-1 (Dry Creek-West Placer) (County of Placer, Cali-
fornia) 16 (Nov. 15, 2001). At the time, I counted eleven competing (high-end)
developments, five of which (including Serrano) had golf courses. Id. at 38-40.
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courses are more strongly correlated with race than large-lot zon-
ing-indeed golf is a better proxy for race than income.5 This
development is, and is likely to remain, economically and racially
isolated.6 And it gets worse. Serrano is, so far as I can tell, not near
any mass transit station and is thus entirely dependent on the
automobile. Thus, even if it were a successful development on its
5. Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 465 ("The data suggests that, during the 1990s, golf
was a substantially better proxy for race than income and a somewhat better proxy than
household wealth. That differential is critical. After all, if income provided a better proxy for
race than golf participation did, those interested in residential racial homogeneity could use
large lot sizes or occupancy restrictions to exclude African Americans."). Strahilevitz care-
fully does not assert that the golf course as an "exclusionary amenity" was "largely
responsible" for their explosion in popularity, but he does find the data he collected rather
suggestive (as do I). Id. at 469.
6. Serrano does advertise diversity: "Residents are a diverse group, ranging from
young families to professional couples and empty nesters." Serrano FAQs, supra note 4. This
strange line indicates simultaneously that there is common ground in public discourse that
exclusionary goals are to be disavowed even as this line also reassures prospective purchasers
that diversity is exactly what the development will not provide. The data on the schools at
Serrano indicate the hollowness of this claim of diversity. Serrano features two elementary
schools and a middle school on site; naturally, these schools are advertised as excellent. See
Serrano FAQs, supra note 4. The chart below compares these schools to California in gen-
eral, the Sacramento area, and a downtown school district in Sacramento (about forty-five
minutes away, by car). The chart indicates that there was already a great deal of racial segre-
gation without the advent of this development (compare the school district and the county
to the whole Sacramento MSA), though clearly the placement of the three new schools in
the development only confirmed the trend (and note that the Serrano schools are a large
percentage of the entire district of which they are a part). Indeed, the schools in Serrano do
achieve even greater income segregation. The school district in downtown Sacramento, ten
times larger than the district in which the development is located, is the mirror-image, both
in terms of race and class.
SERRANO SCHOOLS IN CONTEXT
Percentage
Percentage Percentage Percentage Asian or Free/ Percentage
White Black Hispanic Pacific Reduced English Total
Students Students Students Islander Other Lunch Lerners Students
Caliomia 30.30% 7.80% 47.60/ 8.80% 5.50% 50.10% 24.90% 6,312.103
Sacramento MSA 62.36% 8.94% 16.54% 12.26% 1.38% N/A NA N/A
Sacramento City 21.40% 21.30% 31.20% 22.40% 3.70% 64.301/! 28.80% 50,408
Unified School District
El Dorado County 76.900% 1.30% 12.50% 2.60% 6.70% 22% 5% 29,332
Buckeye Union 80.70% 1.70% 6.70% 6.30'/, 4.60/. 820% 1.60% 4,623
Elementary District
Serrano On-site 78.60% 0.90%" 6.80%* 10.809/•  2.90% 1.209/ 1.70% 660
Elementary School #1
Serrano On-site 70.80% 5.30%" 6.30, 11%" 6.60% 6/60%! 2.30% 647
Elementary School #2
Serrno On-site Middte 83.80% 1.40%." 4.80%' 7.50%" 2.50% 3.30% 0.70% 878
School
All data for 2005-06, and, except for the Sacramento MSA, the data is from Ed-Data, vailable t httpJAww.ed-datak k2.ca.uselcome.asp.
Sacramento MSA data from RAND CaEf, omi, avsai!be at http//ca.rand.org/ststptaopdemopopraceage.htl
'Out of 660 students, this chool had 6 African-American students, 45Hispan!c students ad 71 Asian students.
Out of 647 students, this school had 34 Africas-American students, 41Hispan!c students und 71 Asian students.
** Out of 878 students, this school had 21 Alrican-American students, 42 Hispanic students, and 66 Asian students.
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own economic terms, Serrano would still be problematic from a
socio-economic and environmental perspective.
But now let us consider Serrano as a business failure. Develop-
ments like Serrano are obviously particularly vulnerable to higher
energy prices.7 One might suppose as well that such developments,
which charge a premium for exclusivity, would also be particularly
vulnerable to an economic downturn.8 A development like Serrano
therefore, not very desirable on many policy grounds to begin with,
represents a risky development pattern that was encouraged by the
myriad of means canvassed above, such as the federal tax deduc-
tion for home mortgage interest.
There is an obvious way that state and local government law en-
couraged these kinds of debacles and that is through the law
surrounding land use and property taxation. Because local gov-
ernments are generally funded by property taxes and have the
zoning power, they are constantly on the lookout for projects that
produce a net-positive property tax flow. Serrano's large houses
generated a lot of property tax per resident, and Serrano's wealthy
residents could be presumed to need fewer than average services.
A multi-family development could not compete.
But there is a less obvious way in which local government law
contributed to this debacle. The local schools in Serrano were fi-
nanced in significant part through the issuance of Mello-Roos
7. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, Fuel Prices Shift Math for Life in Far Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2008, at Al8.
8. Data on this particular development is hard to come by, though see supra note 2
for the region as a whole. One indicator of trouble at Serrano itself is the number of proper-
ties that have missed payments on their Mello-Roos taxes (described below) and are facing
foreclosure. According to Serrano's website, as of June 2006, 3,500 homes have been built.
Serrano FAQs, supra note 4. County records indicate that, as of December 2007, 181 homes
in the Serrano Mello-Roos tax district were delinquent on their taxes and, as of July 2008,
another 50 parcels were delinquent. JOE HARN, EL DORADO COUNTY AUDITOR-CONTROLLER,
REPORT ON SPECIAL TAX DELINQUENCIES FOR COMMUNITY FACILITIES DISTRICT No. 1992-1
AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES DISTRICT No. 2001-1: RESOLUTIONS AUTHORIZING FORECLO-
sURE PROCEEDINGS (July 22, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), available at http://www.co.el-dorado.ca.us/bos/wwwroot/attachments/64b947fc-
02d2-49e6-8bOa-7a5433102552.pdf. In general, special tax delinquencies are on the rise in
the area and it is the continued melancholy prediction of this observer that there will soon
be a wave of Mello-Roos bond defaults that overlays the problems with defaults on home
mortgages. Darien Shanske, Note, Public Tax Dollars for Private Suburban Development: A First
Report on a National Phenomenon, 26 VA. TAX REv. 709, 744-45 (2007); Loretta Kalb, Home-
owner Delinquencies Rise, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 23, 2008, at lB. Additional evidence of
trouble afflicting this kind of development abounds. See, e.g., Krissy Clark, Gated Into Foreclo-
sure, WEEKEND AM., Dec. 27, 2008, http://weekendamerica.publicradio.org/display/
web/2008/12/27/gatedinto.foreclosure (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform); Anita Huslin, Go/f Course Communities' Double Bogey, WASH. POST, Aug. 11,
2008, at DI; Dale Kasler, Winchester Country Club on Track to Be Sold, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec.
17, 2008, at B9 (golf course community in Sacramento area bankrupts local developer and is
poised to be sold for fraction of its development cost).
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bonds,9 a type of bond authorized under California law with rough
analogues in most states.'0 The details of these bonds were devel-
oped in a previous paper," but the key fact about Mello-Roos
bonds for our purposes is that they are an easy way for developers
to build schools in new communities. Indeed, under California law,
it is easier to use Mello-Roos bonds to build a new school in a de-
velopment like Serrano than it is to build or rebuild a school in an
existing community. Not surprisingly, these bonds are an extremely
common way of financing infrastructure for suburban develop-
ments in California.
12
The interest on Mello-Roos bonds is exempt from state and fed-
eral income tax, which is a significant subsidy on top of the federal
mortgage deduction. 13 So local government law, in concert with the
9. Serrano advertises that a Mello-Roos levy of approximately $820/year goes towards
its on-site schools. Serrano Homeowners Association, Dues and Fees, http://
www.serranoeldorado.com/newhomes-lg.html (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
10. See Shanske, supra note 8, at 712 n.3 (surveying the availability of Mello-Roos bonds
and related assessment bonds in various states); see also H.R. 159, 185th Gen. Ct. (Mass.
2007) (proposed bill that would have created a financing structure similar to Mello-Roos in
Massachusetts); Jeffrey I. Chapman, The Fiscalization of Land Use: The Increasing Role of Innova-
tive Revenue Raising Instruments to Finance Public Infrastructure, 12 PUB. WORKS MGMT & POL'Y
551 (2008) (listing various infrastructure financing techniques).
11. See generally Shanske, supra note 8.
12. See id. at 727-28 (finding that an estimate that 90% of new development utilized
such taxes was plausible); see also Vladimir Kogan & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Problem with
Being Special: Democratic Values and Special Assessments 15-19 (Feb. 9, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1277522 (finding widespread use of
Mello-Roos type districts in California).
13. And there is still more subsidy from the federal government if the residents deduct
the local (usually Mello-Roos) taxes used to secure the tax-exempt bonds. Pragmatically, one
supposes that it is likely that most people deduct all of these taxes (if they deduct at all),
though as a matter of law (and theory) the question is closer. The taxes should not be de-
ducted if they are "[t]axes assessed against local benefits of a kind tending to increase the
value of the property assessed; but this paragraph shall not prevent the deduction of so
much of such taxes as is properly allocable to maintenance or interest charges." I.R.C.
§ 164(c)(1) (2006). The idea is that if the taxes are like a private expense that one will re-
coup later, then they are no more deductible than any other home improvement. In any
event, the interest portion is deductible, but the principal portion is not deductible to the
extent that the benefits tend to increase the value of the property. In a project like Serrano,
it is a complicated question just how much of the principal is being impounded into home
value. For the inherent complexity in making sense of this deduction, which costs the fed-
eral government $75 billion per year, see Brian Galle, A Republic of the Mind: Cognitive Biases,
Fiscal Federalism, and Section 164 of the Tax Code, 82 IND. L.J. 673 (2007); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal
Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L.
REv. 413 (1996); see also California Franchise Tax Board, Are Mello-Roos Taxes Deductible
on Your Personal Income Tax Return?, http://ww.ftb.ca.gov/individuals/faq/net/
909.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (state of Califor-
nia warning that principal on Mello-Roos taxes are not likely deductible). It is interesting
that the federal tax code seems to assume that most property taxes do not add to property
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federal law of tax exemption, not only encouraged this pattern of
development, but subsidized it. Though hard to quantify, some
non-trivial amount of development would not have occurred, or
would have occurred differently, if not for these influences.14 We
can be fairly confident that these bonds had some effect in spur-
ring sprawl-type development because, as noted above, during the
recent boom in California developers used Mello-Roos taxes in
connection with most new developments. This issue needs to be
understood, and quickly, not only because the federal government
is embarking on large infrastructure expenditures in general, but
on expenditures specifically meant to stimulate more sustainable
development patterns. 15 This means that the federal government
will soon expend even more resources directly in part to undo the
damage done by its indirect subsidies.
This point can be stated succinctly in numbers. Suppose, based
on traditional criteria and assuming that housing is not tax-
advantaged, I could afford a $330,000 home. This assumes a 6%
interest rate on a thirty-year fixed rate mortgage, with a
$2,000/month payment.1 6 Suppose as well that financial innova-
tions, such as an interest-only or shorter term adjustable rate
mortgage, led me to believe that I could afford a $415,000 home
(this is based on a 4% interest rate over thirty years). Now add in
value (hence are deductible), while it believes a subset of such taxes (usually called "assess-
ments," see later discussion) usually do add to property value.
14. The federal tax system encouraged investment in housing in yet another way
through, speaking roughly, excluding a sizable portion of the capital gain on most principal
residences from capital gains taxes ($500,000 for a joint return). I.R.C. § 121. This was a
change to the tax law, made in 1997, which has been found to have had a measurable im-
pact on housing sales. Hui Shan, The Effect of Capital Gains Taxation on Home Sales: Evidence
from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Paper
No. 2008-53, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/ 200853/200853abs.html. There is
no reason to believe that the subsidy provided by Mello-Roos taxes did not similarly affect
the housing market.
15. For example, several of the key federal agencies, the Department of Transporta-
tion, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, have recently agreed to work together towards building "sustainable commu-
nities." HUD, DOT and EPA Partnership: Sustainable Communities (June 16, 2009) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://wvv.epa.gov/
smartgrowth/pdf/dot-hud-epa-partnership-agreement.pdf; see alsoJErnREYJ. SMITH & THO-
MAS GIHRING, FINANCING TRANSIT SYSTEMS THROUGH VALUE CAPTURE: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY (2006); TRANSIT Coop. RESEARCH PROGRAM, TRANSIT-ORIENTED DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPERIENCES, CHALLENGES, AND PROSPECTS 460 (2004)
(recent federally commissioned report recommending, among much else, the use of land-
value financing to encourage more sustainable development).
16. These numbers are fictional, though reasonable so as to illustrate the point that in
some cases the state and local government-related subsidies alone amounted to most of the
premium for living at a development like Serrano (at least as such subsidies were perceived
by the homebuyers).
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only the subsidy from the federal government through the home
mortgage deduction. Assuming a marginal tax rate of 20%, then I
can now afford a home of about $500,000.17 As for the federal and
state tax exemption on the bonds, let us assume that they allow a
developer to take about $20,000 off of the home price,"' meaning
that I am now able to afford a $520,000 home-that is, all together
two-thirds more home than I could afford without (only the speci-
fied!) government interference.
To stay with the particular problem that is the focus of this Arti-
cle: one estimate of the exclusivity premium people paid for golf
course living was $30,000.'9 If this is so, this would mean that, un-
der the best of circumstances, the federal and state governments
have more than subsidized my choice to live in a racially and eco-
nomically exclusive community like Serrano, with the benefit of
the tax exemption in the example above plausibly covering two-
thirds of this premium. This is a dubious choice of subsidy on any
number of grounds. Once the market and economy turns, devel-
opments like Serrano will have, and have had, their home values
plummet, with homes quite possibly selling for less than they cost
to build-and so now the state and federal governments have sub-
sidized housing that is value-destroying from any perspective.
It may be that denser smarter development will never appeal
much to local governments as much as would be ideally desirable
so long as local governments rely on the property tax. This prob-
lem could be in part addressed by subsidizing denser development
and there are, of course, such programs. Yet even based on the
rough calculations presented above, it seems clear that the subsidy
given to sprawl-type development is much larger than the direct
subsidy given to more sustainable development. And even if there
were a greater net subsidy for smart growth, there is no reason
sprawl-pattern exclusionary development should get any subsidy at
all; indeed, to the extent it generates externalities, such as segrega-
tion, local government law should be organized to make such
development more expensive, not cheaper.
B. The Tiebout Model as Obstruction to Course Correction
One way forward is clear. Subsidies like Mello-Roos financing
should only be made available for sustainable residential develop-
17. This is because I am now paying (about) $2,400 per month on the assumption that
most of this payment will be deductible mortgage interest. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3).
18. For the plausibility of this analysis, see Shanske, supra note 8, at 741-42, 751-62.
19. Huslin, supra note 8.
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ment.20 If a state will not adjust its financing laws accordingly, then
the federal government can withhold infrastructure-related funds
or, still more directly, deny any such sprawl-subsidizing bonds the
• 21
federal tax exemption.
What is standing in the way? Ideology, it seems. As it stands now,
Mello-Roos bonds in California cannot even be used to subsidize
affordable housing. Further, as it stands now, Mello-Roos bonds
also cannot be used to subsidize alternative energy. The California
Legislature acted to change both of these limitations, though not,
sadly, to prohibit the use of Mello-Roos bonds for developments
like Serrano altogether.3 Both times Governor Schwarzenegger
vetoed the legislation.24 The error in the Governor's analysis is
20. There is no better time for such a dramatic change to Mello-Roos law because the
collapse of the housing market means that virtually no such bonds are currently being is-
sued and there is presumably little expectation that this is going to change any time soon.
See CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM'N, CALIFORNIA MELLO-Roos COMMUNITY FACILITIES
DISTRICTS YEARLY FISCAL STATUS REPORTS AND REPORTS ON DRAWS ON RESERVES AND DE-
FAULTS 3 (2007) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform), available at
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/reports/M-Roos/2007.pdf. Therefore, the cost in dis-
rupted reliance interests would be minimal.
21. There are already very complicated regulations governing the use of tax-exempt
bonds, particularly as concerns "private use," with a paradigm question being whether it is
permissible to use tax-exempt bonds to build a sports stadium. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.141-0 to -16
(2009). It might be prohibitively difficult to craft a rule barring the use of tax-exempt pro-
ceeds in a case like Serrano, assuming that we wish to retain the tax-exemption for projects
that undertake to build infrastructure and schools (I am not sure that we should have the
tax-exemption at all). I am not convinced, however, that such a rule is impossible and, in
fact, the IRS did promulgate proposed regulations that would likely have had this effect, but
these proposals were scaled back upon encountering opposition. See Definition of Private
Activity Bonds, 62 Fed. Reg. 2275, 2276, 2279 (Jan. 16, 1997) (discussing changes to pro-
posed regulations in order not to interfere with "with traditional tax assessment bond
financings"). Bonds used for projects like Serrano have some particular characteristics that I
think can be picked out and prohibited. Unlike most bonds issued by governments, they are
secured by the land and not by a promise of the jurisdiction to tax. Furthermore, the bond
proceeds are generally used to purchase the public improvements from the developer, and
so it is common in these transactions that the developer must show the wherewithal to fi-
nance the projects on her own. A sensible rule could be that the federal tax-exemption is
not to be used for land-secured financings and/or financings where the tax-exempt pro-
ceeds essentially "take out" a private financing. The proposed regulation achieved much the
same thing by forbidding "the use of bond proceeds to provide property that discharges a
primary and unconditional legal obligation of a nongovernmental person." Id. at 2276. An-
other alternative approach might limit the use of tax-exemption geographically. That is, the
federal tax-exemption is not available for land-secured financing outside of certain devel-
opment zones. Maryland, for instance, already has a similar law. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE
FIN. & PROC. § 5-7B-01 (2008) (restricting state funding to priority areas).
22. S.B. 1432, 2005-06 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2006); A.B. 1709, 2007-08 Leg. Sess. (Cal.
2008).
23. Cf H.R. 159, 185th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2007) (proposed Massachusetts law would not
have allowed Mello-Roos type financing for schools or for "gated communities").
24. VETO MESSAGE, S.B. 1432, 2005-06 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2006); SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS
OF S.B. 1432, 2005-06 Leg. Sess., at 10-11 (Cal. 2006) (statement of California Association
of Realtors); VETO MESSAGE, A.B. 1709, 2007-08 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
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deep and fundamental. In particular, the Governor and his allies
on this issue seem to believe that financing mechanisms like Mello-
Roos are a neutral market mechanism and do not represent a po-
litical choice as to what kind of communities we want.25 From this
perspective, allowing Mello-Roos bonds to be used for politically
desirable ends is an unwarranted intrusion. Yet Mello-Roos bonds
are already a government intrusion into the housing market that
encourages less affordable and less sustainable development pat-
terns.
Why can the Governor not see this? It is because local govern-
ments are surmised to be quasi-market actors and therefore the
State should leave them alone to the extent possible. Making
Mello-Roos financing available to local governments is supposedly
allowing the market to work, whereas redirecting some of the sub-
sidy these bonds represent to affordable housing is unfair social
engineering.
What is the theory of local governments that compares them to
private entities in this way, and why has it been so persuasive? This
dominant theory of local governments is called the Tiebout model,
and it is the Tiebout model that must be very seriously reconsid-
ered before common sense local government reforms can
commence. In particular, this Article argues that the Tiebout
model requires the making of political decisions about the alloca-
tion of public goods at the local level-this despite the insistence
of its proponents that there are only market transactions that
should be left alone.
The Tiebout model analogizes the choice of where to live with a
shopping trip and purportedly demonstrates that jurisdictional
competition for citizen-consumers can ensure that the right quan-
tity of local public goods is produced at the right price. A
functioning Tiebout dynamic is supposed to provide not only the
benefit of the efficient use of resources because everyone is getting
the amenities they want at the price that they want, but it is also
desirable because the property tax in a functioning Tiebout dy-
namic is acting as a price for a bundle of local goods and services.
Since in such a case property taxes are a price that homeowners
25. See, e.g., VETO MESSAGE, S.B. 1432, supra note 24 ("[T] his bill also contains a provi-
sion that would allow Mello-Roos taxes to be imposed on homeowners in order to finance
affordable housing projects. This provision represents a fundamental shift in the purpose of
Mello-Roos taxes and is one that I cannot support. While I support the construction of
much-needed affordable housing in our state, the burden to finance that construction
should not be placed on homeowners in the form of what is essentially a tax increase."); see
also SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1432, supra note 24 (statement of California Association
of Realtors).
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willingly pay by choosing a jurisdiction, the property tax, unlike
other taxes, causes comparatively less deadweight loss from evasion
of the tax.
Already in Tiebout's original article in 1956, an additional bene-
fit of the model was that its market-approach delivered relative
efficiency, at least in comparison to the alternative method of pub-
lic good provision, which is determining the provision of local
public goods through a political process. Although the Tiebout
model is desirable on several grounds (at least in theory), in par-
ticular its relative allocative efficiency and minimization of
deadweight loss, this Article argues that its promise of an escape
from political constraints is illusory on two grounds. First, the very
selection of a model ofjurisdictional competition (i.e., the Tiebout
model) is itself a political decision about resource allocation be-
cause, among other reasons, the Tiebout model does not allow for
redistribution of wealth at the local level. This is so because, if
property taxes function as a price for local services, then taxpayers
will only pay for services they actually receive. The Tiebout model
also represents a political choice to the extent that even its propo-
nents concede it tends to produce sprawl-type development
because, for example, homeowners are given incentive to move to
more and more exclusive new communities, communities that can
offer ever lower taxes because of their ever higher property tax
base. Because the negative externalities generated by sprawl must
be borne by the greater community outside the jurisdiction (e.g.,
the costs of traffic congestion), a political choice is made to favor
those in the development at the expense of those outside its bor-
ders.
The second political constraint, and the one that is the focus of
this Article, is that background legal rules will tend to select among
possible sets of amenity bundles that are equally efficient, at least
pragmatically. If the Tiebout model is to be efficient, then econo-
mies of scale dictate that there cannot be bundles for everyone. A
corollary to economies of scale is that local public goods tend to be
bundled. A properly sized school district will have thousands of
inhabitants who will also need to agree on parks, police, etc.
Economies of scale and bundling thus indicate that we all live in
second-best jurisdictions because everyone will have to compro-
mise on at least some of their preferences. There can be many sets
of second-best jurisdictions, and the legal background rules will
affect what the available local government bundles will look like.
For instance, if annexation by a larger municipality is easy and se-
cession from it difficult, then it is more likely that wealthy enclaves
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will be absorbed into larger metropolitan areas, enabling the
amenity bundles desired by some citizens, but frustrating the de-
sires of others.
This second constraint is further developed through returning
to the example of Serrano, our gated community centered on a
golf-course that was subsidized through the use of tax-exempt
bonds. The development of a golf-course gated community argua-
bly represents finely grained, and efficient, Tiebout-sorting.
However, it also represents a political choice to the extent that the
state law rules for the issuance of tax-exempt bonds make it easier
to build schools in a new community like this than they make it to
build schools in existing communities.
The example of Serrano also brings us back to the beginning of
this Article and to the current crisis. Blithely ignoring that politics
is even relevant has encouraged local government law to amplify
market forces to such an extent that the resulting development
pattern cannot even be considered second-best. Billions of dollars
of new infrastructure was built in new developments like Serrano
using tax-exempt bonds. This was not second-best, but a waste that
should not be repeated.
This Article proceeds in two main parts. In Part II, the Tiebout
model will be discussed in greater depth. It is essential to under-
stand its strengths, as well as why it is not going anywhere as the
dominant model for explaining and justifying our local govern-
ment landscape. Once we understand the Tiebout model, we will
consider its limitations in Part III. Particularly, we will consider why
it is, and must be, animated by certain political choices as to the
shape of our communities. Once it is clear that even a pure Tie-
bout-inspired local government regime is not neutral, much less is
a landscape dotted with subsidies like Mello-Roos taxes neutral, the
ground will be cleared for the kind of reforms outlined in this in-
troductory Part I.
II. WHAT IS THE TIEBOUT MODEL AND WHY
WE CANNOT ESCAPE IT
Before we can critique the Tiebout model, we must know what it
is and why it matters. This is the task of this Part.
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A. Tiebout's Article in its Original Context
Tiebout's famous article was a response to a specific economic
question about the provision of public goods posed by the econo-
mist Paul Samuelson in two articles in 1954 and 1955. Samuelson
maintained that "no decentralized pricing system can serve to de-
termine optimally the[] level[] of collective consumption [of
public goods] .26 This is because "it is in the selfish interest of each
person to give false signals, to pretend to have less interest in a
given collective consumption activity than he really had, etc."
2 7
Samuelson ultimately concluded that political deliberation was
necessary to the extent that a modern economy relies on the provi-
sion of public goods and both articles end with a plea for modesty
on the part of economists, conceding a place to other disciplines
and even "welfare politics."
2 s
Tiebout glosses Samuelson's analysis this way:
[N]o "market-type" solution exists to determine the level of
expenditures on public goods. Seemingly, we are faced with
26. Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON. & STAT.
387, 388 (1954) [hereinafter Samuelson, Pure Theory].
27. Id. at 388-89. Samuelson's next sentence is especially interesting given Tiebout's
response:
I must emphasize this: taxing according to a benefit theory of taxation cannot at all
solve the computational problem in the decentralized manner possible for the first
category of "private" goods to which the ordinary market pricing applies and which
do not have the "external effects" basic to the very notion of collective consumption
goods.
Id. at 389. Samuelson is indicating that because public goods have the characteristic of allow-
ing one to consume them without revealing how much one is willing to pay, there will still
be imperfect revelation of preferences even if taxes were levied according to a benefit prin-
ciple. Christopher Yoo has recently made the point very clearly:
For private goods, consumers pay the same price and signal the different valuations
that they place on the good by purchasing different quantities. For pure public
goods, consumers consume the same quantity of production and signal the intensity
of their preferences by their willingness to pay different prices.
... The problem is that when consumers express the intensity of their preferences
through prices rather than quantities, there is no way to induce consumers to reveal
their marginal valuations.
Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA.
L. REv. 635, 638-39 (2007).
28. See Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37
REv. ECON. & STAT. 350, 356 (1955); Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 26, at 389.
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the problem of having a rather large portion of our national
income allocated in a "non-optimal" way when compared with
the private sector."
As a corollary to his search for a market-type solution, Tiebout is
trying to determine the "appropriate" level of "benefit taxation"-
that is, taxes assessed as a matter of the benefit received rather
than "ability to pay"; benefit taxes are more like prices than tradi-
tional taxes because the tax paid has an explicit connection with a
benefit received.30 The exclusive use of benefit taxes would prevent
redistribution at the local level, except to the extent that the local
voters actually benefited from redistribution (or at least perceived
a benefit) . In short, as Tiebout himself notes, his model is meant
to provide an "invisible hand" explanation for as many public
goods as possible.2
Tiebout's solution to Samuelson's problem is that citizen-
consumers can reveal their preferences for local public goods in
the same way that they reveal their preferences for ordinary private
goods; the choice of where to live is essentially a shopping trip.s
3
The fact that local public goods are spread out in space thus pro-
vides the means by which citizen-consumers can reveal their
preferences, given that one needs to pay a price to live in a certain
jurisdiction. Tiebout recognizes that a market for local public
goods will exist to a greater or lesser extent based on a number of
assumptions that at best only approximate the real world, includ-
ing whether there are a sufficient number of communities,
mobility, no externalities and whether the individual municipalities
are themselves producing local public goods efficiendy.34 However,
Tiebout argues that, to the extent his model would allocate public
goods efficiently, public policy should endeavor to make his model
more of a reality:
Policies that promote residential mobility and increase the
knowledge of the consumer-voter will improve the allocation
of government expenditures in the same sense that mobility
29. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. EcON. 416, 416
(1956).
30. Id. at 417 n.8.
31. Cf Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under
the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REv. 413, 478-79 (1996).
32. Tiebout, supra note 29, at 422 (quoting Samuelson's use of this famous phrase
from Adam Smith, but Samuelson was describing the operation of a market in private goods
as different from that of a market in public goods).
33. Id. at 422.
34. Id. at 419.
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among jobs and knowledge relevant to the location of indus-
try and labor improve the allocation of private resources."
Tiebout also considers whether revenue-expenditure patterns
should be fixed to facilitate this market mechanism. The idea here
is that people should get what they pay for and not be forced to
take some other amenity bundle through the ex post operation of
politics.
36
There are other essentially normative arguments in Tiebout's ar-
ticle. For instance, Tiebout notes that his model will work best if
the various communities try to achieve their optimal size relative to
their stock of public goods (i.e., they seek more people until di-
minishing returns set in) .Y How then to keep people from moving
to a community that is "optimum"? Tiebout answers:
The case of the community which is at the optimum size and
tries to remain so is not hard to visualize. Again proper zoning
laws, implicit agreements among realtors, and the like are suf-
ficient to keep the population stable.
This passage and others indicate that the Tiebout hypothesis from
the start required agreeable background legal rules (such as zon-
ing) to help create a necessarily limited number of optimally-sized
communities that would compete with one another. Although ju-
risdictional competition would obviate the need for political
processes deciding on the production and allocation of public
goods, Tiebout does not consider from whence the pro-
competitive legal rules and other policies would emerge. Nor does
Tiebout consider the implications of economies of scale on
whether there will need to be political decisions as concerns who
will have to compromise on which preferences.
35. Id. at 423.
36. Id. at 423-24. There is a tension here because one may move into a community
wanting to affect some change by use of voice. Perhaps I love golf and have friends within an
exclusive golf course community like Serrano, and so I buy a house there, but I also want to
vote for changes that will make the development and the schools within it more diverse.
This paradox touches on a variety of issues: 1) politics may itself be a desired amenity; 2)
amenities tend to be bundled; and 3) there is a gap between the production of public goods
and their provision that may itself result in market failure (e.g., for parallel reasons, no de-
veloper will build a more diverse development even though such developments are being
underproduced). See David Lowery, Answering the Public Choice Challenge: A Neoprogressive
Research Agenda, 12 GOVERNANCE: INT'LJ. POL'Y, ADMIN. & INSTITUTIONS 29, 44-45 (1999).
37. Tiebout, supra note 29, at 419.
38. Id. at 420.
SPRING 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
B. The Tiebout Model
What I am calling the "Tiebout model" is the development of
Tiebout's original idea that efficient production of local public
goods can result from jurisdictional competition. Critical additions
included zoning" and the median voter.'° I will focus on the model
as developed in the recent work of William Fischel. Zoning is con-
ceptually essential because it allows local governments to zone out
free-riders. For example, suppose a wealthy suburban school dis-
trict has excellent schools, paid for by a 2% property tax rate on
homes that average $500,000 in assessed value, or $10,000 property
tax/average home per year. Suppose the primary developer for this
subdivision still owns a number of lots at the edge of town4 and
that there are no zoning regulations. The developer can build, say,
another four new large single-family homes or a fifty-unit condo-
minium. The individual condominiums will go for a premium
because of the school district, but each will sell for less than the
single-family homes, say for an average of $200,000 . In this sce-
nario, the developer is earning a windfall from the ex ante
investment and continued disproportionate investment43 of the rest
of the community in the local schools and other amenities. Of
course, in order to sell those first single-family homes at a pre-
mium, the developer and/or the municipality probably needed to
assure the future homeowners and voters ("homevoters" in
Fischel's parlance) that such a scenario would not occur. Zoning is
a very efficient way to achieve this.
In fact, from the beginning, the Supreme Court, in upholding
zoning generally, was aware that wealthy homeowners would use
zoning powers to prevent lower-income free-riders, "mere para-
39. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 65 (2001) (following Hamil-
ton); see also Tiebout, supra note 29, at 419.
40. FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 72.
41. I make this assumption because otherwise the developer would likely have had to
pay an amount for the land reflecting its highest and best use.
42. So the developer may sell four homes for $2 million or fifty condominiums for $10
million. I am assuming that the likely greater cost of putting up the condominiums still
leaves the developer with much more profit. To the extent exclusionary zoning prevents this
deal from happening then, at least at this level, exclusionary zoning is causing an efficiency
loss because the land is worth more to the potential condominium owners than to the large
home owners. Of course, the overall system may be more efficient with exclusionary zoning
(e.g., it allows for ever more precise pricing). As discussed infra, this question of whether
jurisdictional competition is efficient in practice is not the focus of this Article.
43. That is, the average condo owner will only pay $4,000 a year in property taxes (2%
* 200,000) rather than $10,000. In a perfect market (which is unlikely), the condos should
increase in price to fully impound the fact that they represent a tax bargain and the homes
should decrease in price to represent that they are subsidizing others. Obviously, this "solu-
tion" to the problem of free-riders will not be appealing to the preexisting homeowners.
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sites" as the Court put it, in single-family residential neighbor-
hoods."
Fischel postulates that, since so many homeowners have for cul-
tural and economic reasons (including government subsidies)
taken a massively undiversified position in their homes, they are
powerfully motivated to pressure local governments to protect
their property values.45 The simple majoritarian model of most lo-
cal governments (e.g., one city council, no senate) means that the
local government level is where the median (home)voter rules.46
The conventional view is that homevoters are sensitive to tax and
amenity bundles and that the median homevoter rules at the local
level.47 Indeed, empirical evidence is widely believed to confirm the
existence of the Tiebout dynamic more generally (at least to some
extent).4s
C. The Import of Property Taxation
To the extent that homevoters are voting with their feet for an
amenity bundle, the property tax functions as a price for services
they willingly buy. 49 The more competition there is among jurisdic-
tions, the more likely individuals are to get exactly what they want
in exchange for their property taxes. In contrast, for taxes on capi-
tal or corporate profits, jurisdictional competition will tend to
44. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926).
45. FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 4, 19.
46. Id. at 89.
47. See, e.g., id. at 60-61, 88-89.
48. See, e.g., Robert Inman, Commentary, in THE TIEBOtrr MODEL AT Fiwrv 46-53 (Wil-
liam A. Fischel ed., 2006) [hereinafter TIEBOUT AT FIFTY]. Even critics of the Tiebout model
acknowledge its relative explanatory power. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-
Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 405-06, 416-17 (1990). My interpretation
of the (mixed) findings is that the Tiebout model is especially (though not wholly) explana-
tory of certain market segments, say of housing directed at relatively affluent households
with children.
49. Cf Joseph Bankman, State Tax Shelters and State Taxation of Capita 26 VA. TAX REV.
769, 784 (2007). ("The reason why a typical tax causes substitution away from the taxed
activity is that there is no relationship, at the margin, between the tax paid and government
services received. A taxpayer does not get any additional government services from working
an additional hour and paying the tax on her labor or from saving an additional dollar and
paying tax on her interest income. In the Tiebout model, however, the relationship between
municipality and taxpayer can be thought of as that between a seller and purchaser. A resi-
dent purchases schools for her children with her property tax. The tax does not rise with
income, and unless she pays the tax, she cannot live in the city and use its schools. There is a
direct relationship between the tax paid and the services received. There is no inefficiency if
a taxpayer works to purchase schooling for her children, just as there is no efficiency if the
taxpayer works to buy a car.").
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reduce the tax base. 50 Finally, property taxes play an important role
in a taxation system dominated by the income tax, serving as a tax
on the imputed income that homeowners enjoy from owning
rather than renting.5' These arguments suggest that whatever the
limits of the allocative efficiencies delivered by the Tiebout model
or concerns with its distributive consequences, there are other rea-
sons to retain the property tax as a key component of local finance.
Thus, even if one is not persuaded that the Tiebout model obtains
or provides efficiency gains,52 one still needs to consider the impact
of jurisdictional competition to the extent one wishes to retain the
property tax as a central means for local governments to fund
themselves because of its relative merits compared to other taxes.
D. Tiebout and Public Choice
Bratton and McCahery helpfully summarize the relationship be-
tween Tiebout and public choice theory as follows:
Public choice proponents countered [the public interest the-
ory of government by claiming] that the "public interest"
cannot be meaningfully articulated in the first place, much
less utilized as a template for regulation .... [T]he Tiebout
model, with its competition-based local public goods equilib-
50. Cf id. at 786 ("[Tlhe corporate tax, even if levied in what might pass for a 'pure'
form, does not lead to anything like a Tiebout equilibrium. Instead, those who have mod-
eled the effects of interstate competition on the corporate tax have come to more
pessimistic conclusions. In one leading set of models, high corporate taxes cause companies
to locate out of state, which in turn reduces in-state employment and wages. States respond
by reducing the corporate tax rate. In equilibrium, for states that must rely on the corporate
tax, services are underfunded. There are services that would improve welfare (even after
allowing for their tax cost) in a world without competition that cannot be provided in a
world with tax competition. The models do not state how much services will be under-
funded. In general, the models are consistent with (but do not themselves tell) a story of tax
competition in which the corporate tax becomes such an expensive and poor source of
revenue that it is dropped altogether.").
51. For compelling arguments for the property tax, with an emphasis on why the
property tax has survived and should survive, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Once and Future
Property Tax: A Dialogue with My Younger Self 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 2199, 2216-20 (2002); see
also Bankman, supra note 49, at 788; Frank Shafroth, The Unsimple Pleasures of Property Taxes-
Are Virginia Candidates Looking to the Future or November?, 36 ST. TAX NOTES 453 (2005).
52. Thus, for instance, one might believe that the current local government system is
characterized by an inefficient level of exclusionary zoning that results in inefficiencies, such
as sprawl. Yet if one believes in the semi-independent virtues of the property tax, then simply
abolishing local jurisdictions is not an option, and so we are bound to consider how we
might change the rules governing local jurisdictions to arrive at a more efficient outcome.
53. See also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 11-12 (Univ. of Mich. Press 1962)
(starting from an attack on the notion of the public interest).
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rium, shows up in the analysis to offer a theoretical cure:
Since market transactions are the most accurate allocators of
resources, government should be structured so that regula-
tion follows not from discussion of the public interest but
from the responses of at-the-margin producers. .. . The Tie-
bout model's prescription of devolution of regulatory
authority to junior levels of government tracks a conclusion
reached independently in another line of public choice
theory. Under this "Leviathan" theory, government actors-
particularly those in central government-use their monopo-
lists' positions to pursue governmental revenue
maximization.... Jurisdictional competition [i.e., Tiebout]
theory makes its second contribution in rebuttal to the argu-
ment that devolution simply turns regulatory subject matter
over to the distortive manipulations of state and local interest
groups. The disciplinary effect of competition across states
and localities minimizes local capture losses.54
Though the embrace of Tiebout by public choice theorists may
be somewhat ad hoc, Bratton and McCahery make a compelling
case that the existence of robust jurisdictional competition helps
explain why it is advisable from a public choice perspective to
devolve regulatory powers to the state and local governments. The
answer is, much as in Tiebout's original response to Samuelson,
that local governments are constrained by competition and the
central government is not (or to a much lesser degree). Thus
somewhat independent from Tiebout's original article, the public
choice literature suggests that jurisdictional competition not only
provides allocative efficiency, but regulatory efficiency as well.
54. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics ofJurisdictional Com-
petition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 213-16 (1997); see also
Lowery, supra note 36, at 35-36.
55. For instance, Buchanan embraces both Tiebout and a property tax limitation re-
gime like Proposition 13. GEOFFREY BRENNAN &JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX:
ANALYTIC FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 197-98 (1980). Clearly, there is a great
deal of overlap since both competition and outright limitation control the size of local gov-
ernment. However, as discussed infra, a property tax limitation regime inevitably interferes
to some extent with the operation of the property tax as a price. Interestingly, in the imme-
diate aftermath of Proposition 13, Buchanan observed an ominous reason for the success of
a single-issue proposition only about tax cuts, namely that voters could approve cuts without
any corresponding consensus on cutting government services, i.e., on trimming the size of
the Leviathan. James M. Buchanan, The Potentialfor Taxpayer Revolt in American Democracy, 59
Soc. ScI. Q. 691, 693-94 (1979). At the level of theory, this suggests the possibility of tax
limitation regimes that interfere with the Tiebout dynamic but do not in fact limit the size of
government-this observer would suggest that this is in fact an accurate description of many
tax limitation regimes.
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E. Tiebout and the Constitution
The move from public choice theory, especially its embrace of
the Tiebout model, to Madison and constitutional theory, is a small
one. As Judge Easterbrook put it, citing to Tiebout explicitly:
Madison's elaboration of the constitutional plan is the best
piece of political philosophy penned on this side of the Atlan-
tic. Recognizing the simultaneous terror, inevitability, and
desirability of faction, and proposing conquest by division
(the strategy of faction itself), is genius. Madison also antici-
pates, without quite articulating, the point that a plurality of
jurisdictions checks the power of faction even at the local
level. Although each local government may control immov-
able assets (principally land), its ability to take any other step
is constrained by exit-in other words, by competition with
other jurisdictions. A federal republic strengthens this compe-
tition by facilitating movement of assets and persons. Public
schools may be the government's tools, but you can shop for
the government you prefer!56
Easterbrook's praise of a uniquely American political philosophy
also contains an implicit reference to Gordon Wood's famous ar-
gument that the founders specifically designed a post-classical
constitution-that is, a constitution that did not rely on the civic
virtue of the citizenry.-7 Indeed, on Easterbrook's gloss, the Consti-
tution is designed to operate through the citizens' exercise of exit,
not voice (and certainly not loyalty).
In fact, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has contributed to
the viability of the Tiebout model, and perhaps somewhat con-
sciously so. The power to zone, essential to the Tiebout model, did
not receive the Court's blessing until 1926,5 and as astute an ob-
server as Cardozo did not believe that approval of the zoning
power was a foregone conclusion.59 We have already seen that, at
56. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspec-
tive, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1328, 1333 (1994) (citing Tiebout).
57. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 521-22 (1975) [hereinafter MA-
CHIAVELLIAN MOMENT]; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 606-15 (2d ed. 1998).
58. Viii. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning gener-
ally under the police power).
59. According to Cardozo, the zoning power may well have been struck down by the
Court if by the time it reached the Court it had not been operating so widely and success-
fully. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 126 (Columbia Univ. Press
1928).
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least to some extent, the Court was moved by proto-Tieboutian ar-
guments to uphold zoning as essential to excluding free-riders. A
strong argument was made decades later that there were limits to
the zoning power inherent to the federal Constitution, particularly
as a result of the Equal Protection Clause-put simply, at the end
of the day, there needed to be somewhere for apartment-dwellers
to live, parasites or not. These challenges were rejected, with the
result that for practical purposes any limits on zoning must be a
matter of state law.60 Finally, one might have thought that school
district lines would not be respected if they were used to recreate a
system of segregation that a federal court was trying to combat in a
neighboring district, but the Court decided otherwise in Milliken.6 '
District lines are particularly important to a Tiebout dynamic be-
cause they represent the boundaries of the amenity bundle
purchased, and so Milliken in effect protected purchasers from hav-
ing their bundle of goods disturbed after having purchased a
home.
Perhaps the strongest challenge to the underlying constitutional
underpinnings of the Tiebout model involved school financing. It
is axiomatic that local governments are mere creations of the
state,62 and this would suggest that states cannot do indirectly
through setting up a certain local government system what they
could not do directly.63 That is, a state could not set up a
centralized system for providing education where resources
diverged wildly between regions; such a scheme would fail even
64
rational basis review. Why then could a state achieve the same
60. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)
(upholding local single-residency zoning plan despite racially discriminatory impact); Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (denying standing to nearby residents of a town that was per-
vasively zoned for large-lot single family residences); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974) (upholding zoning for "single-family" dwellings).
61. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) ("[W]ithout an interdistrict violation
and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict rem-
edy.").
62. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). Just because it is axiomatic
does not mean this principle has been consistently applied (or should be); see the discus-
sion of Barron, infra note 93.
63. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S.
353, 361 (1992) (holding that "a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the
strictures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce
through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself.").
64. In fact, distinguishing its famous holding in San Antonio Independent SchoolDistrict v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court indicated just this in Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265
(1986). In Papasan, the Court confronted a complicated situation where, in essence, certain
lands given to the State of Mississippi by the federal government for the purpose of public
education were only generating revenues for the school districts in which these lands hap-
pen to have been located. The Court, speaking through Justice White, found that this
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result through the means of tying local educational spending to
the local property tax? Famously, the Supreme Court in Rodriguez
held that such a system survived rational basis review, despite the
resulting gross disparities in resources. Although the Court used
some general rhetoric of "local control" in explaining what was
rational about this system, 66 it was specifically local control over
revenues that was at issue and the Court's decision reflects this.
6 7
The issue could not have been local control per se because it is
possible to have a centralized (and equalized) school finance
regime where local school boards are still responsible for local
administration. In many ways, this is the system that has developed
in California.6 ' And so in finding the system at issue in Rodriguez
rational, the Court was apparently accepting as at least rational
some of the Tiebout-type reasoning we have already discussed as to
the benefits of local control of property taxes in particular.
allocation might fail rational basis review (the case was remanded) and distinguished the
situation from that upheld in Rodriguez as follows:
This case is therefore very different from Rodriguez, where the differential financing
available to school districts was traceable to school district funds available from local
real estate taxation, not to a state decision to divide state resources unequally among
school districts. The rationality of the disparity in Rodriguez, therefore, which rested
on the fact that funding disparities based on differing local wealth were a necessary
adjunct of allowing meaningful local control over school funding, does not settle the
constitutionality of disparities alleged in this case, and we differ with the Court of
Appeals in this respect.
Papasan, 478 U.S. at 288.
65. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40 ("We are asked to condemn the State's judgment in con-
ferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for local
interests. In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area in which it has
traditionally deferred to state legislatures. This Court has often admonished against such
interferences with the State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause .... ").
66. See, e.g., id. at 49-54 ("The persistence of attachment to government at the lowest
level where education is concerned reflects the depth of commitment of its supporters. In
part, local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the freedom to devote more
money to the education of one's children.... [A]ny scheme of local taxation-indeed the
very existence of identifiable local governmental units-requires the establishment of juris-
dictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary."). It is interesting that the Court here
acknowledges that, at least as a general matter, district lines are "arbitrary." It is certainly
conceivable that deference to local government boundaries is justified as deference to pre-
existing political communities. To some extent, this might have been true and is still true, as
even newer communities can assume a meaningful identity. Nevertheless, I think that the
Court has wisely recognized that the current convoluted patchwork of overlapping entities
cannot be justified in terms of pre-existing (or even current) communal attachments.
67. See, e.g., id. at 49-50 ("Equally important, however, is the opportunity [local con-
trol] offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how those local
tax dollars will be spent.").
68. See generally Eric J. Brunner & Jon Sonstelie, California's School Finance Reform: An
Experiment in Fiscal Federalism, in TIEBOUT AT FiFrY, supra note 48, at 55.
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These cases do not of course prove that Tiebout has been consti-
tutionalized. They do, however, suggest that the rationality of
jurisdictional competition has been found to be constitutionally
• 69
salient. Indeed, there are authors who make strong arguments
69. I also submit that a grand theory making sense of the Court's position on the role
and justification for local government (per Barron) is not possible at this point and so par-
tial explanations will have to do. For the demise of Barron's synthesis, see infta note 93. For
a particularly disconcerting line of cases, see the role of local governments in the Fullilove,
Croson, Metro Broadcasting, Adarand line of cases. Fullilove upheld an affirmative action pro-
gram at the federal level, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), while Croson invalidated
a very similar program at the local level specifically because it was at the local level. Citing
The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) and Gordon Wood,Justice Scalia explained:
As Justice O'Connor acknowledges, [in her opinion for the majority,] it is one thing
to permit racially based conduct by the Federal Government-whose legislative pow-
ers concerning matters of race were explicitly enhanced by the Fourteenth
Amendment-and quite another to permit it by the precise entities against whose
conduct in matters of race that Amendment was specifically directed.
A sound distinction between federal and state (or local) action based on race
rests not only upon the substance of the Civil War Amendments, but upon social
reality and governmental theory.... What the record shows, in other words, is that
racial discrimination against any group finds a more ready expression at the state
and local than at the federal level. To the children of the Founding Fathers, this
should come as no surprise. An acute awareness of the heightened danger of oppres-
sion from political factions in small, rather than large, political units dates to the very
beginning of our national history. As James Madison observed in support of the pro-
posed Constitution's enhancement of national powers ....
City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521-23 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citations omitted). This line of reasoning was accepted, it seemed, by a majority of the
Court in Metro Broadcasting in upholding a different federal affirmative action program.
Metro Broad., Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 565 (1990) ("[M]uch of the language and reason-
ing in Croson reaffirmed the lesson of Fullilove that race-conscious classifications adopted by
Congress to address racial and ethnic discrimination are subject to a different standard than
such classifications prescribed by state and local governments."). This distinction between
the federal and state governments was then abandoned in Adarand. Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 252 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Ironically, after all of the
time, effort, and paper this Court has expended in differentiating between federal and state
affirmative action, the majority today virtually ignores the issue."). Yet this argument is not
yet gone-the Madison-inspired argument about the perils of local decision-making makes
another appearance (without Wood and Madison) in the dissent of Justice Scalia in Romer,
one of the lead cases cited to by Barron for the proposition that local governments are al-
lowed to be out in front in connection with equality. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645-47
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The problem (a problem, that is, for those who wish to re-
tain social disapprobation of homosexuality) is that, because those who engage in
homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities,
... have high disposable income, ... and, of course, care about homosexual-rights issues
much more ardently than the public at large .... " (citations omitted)). There are many
other lines of cases suggesting there might be a special role/analysis for local governments
(such as involving Section 1983 and voting rights). For instance, local governments have
recently been given a privileged status in dormant commerce clause analysis. United Haulers
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that the Tiebout dynamic should be made more salient to constitu-
tional law. Particularly interesting in this regard is Been's argument
that the Tiebout dynamic is sufficiently robust that the Court's
exactions jurisprudence is misguided precisely because it is un-
needed.70 That is, there is no reason for imposing fuzzy legal rules
on exactions when the marketplace for government services will
police and prevent excessive exactions."
III. RECONSIDERING THE TIEBOUT MODEL:
THE ROLE OF POLITICS
As should be clear at this point, the Tiebout model is a powerful
justification for our current local government system. It offers the
efficient allocation of resources and taxation, constrains the size of
government, and promises to provide the level of local public
goods that people want. As discussed in the previous Section, many
leading Supreme Court decisions imply a naive form of the Tie-
bout model. Even if they do not, the Court has helped cultivate the
preconditions for a functioning Tiebout dynamic and these federal
doctrines (and much state law) make the current jurisdictional
landscape hard to change. Empirical evidence suggests that the
Tiebout dynamic is a fact, and certain theorists plausibly suggest
that this fact should further inform the Court's jurisprudence.72
Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007). In 2008, the logic
of United Haulers was found to apply to the tax exempt municipal bond market. See Dep't of
Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810 (2008).
70. Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. Rxv. 473 (1991).
71. Id. at 527-28 ("Given the availability of numerous communities from which to
choose and differences between the public service and tax packages that communities offer,
the fact that consumers shop for a public service and tax package is strong evidence support-
ing the core Tiebout proposition that jurisdictions compete for residents by attempting to
offer desirable public service/tax packages."). Interestingly, as recently observed by Schrag-
ger, a leading Tiebout scholar, like Fischel, believes that, to the contrary, courts should
vigorously enforce the Takings Clause in support of a Tiebout dynamic. Richard C.
Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. L. REv. 1091,
1149-50 (2008) (construing Been and Fischel, supra). This underscores the extent to which
our understanding of the empirics of Tiebout dynamics, even if they exist at all, does not at
all lead to obvious policy prescriptions and this is another reason not to eschew politics. The
focus of this Article, however, is not on the limitations of Tiebout in reality, so much as on
acknowledging the limitations of Tiebout even in an ideal situation.
72. As to these proposals, I must demur. First, though there is empirical evidence for
the existence of Tiebout dynamics, I am doubtful that these dynamics are of sufficient mag-
nitude to be of constitutional salience. That is, for instance, I do not think that Tiebout is a
sufficient constraint on local governments generally to justify that they be governed by dif-
ferent doctrines. Cf Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property
Protection, 107 COLUM. L. Rxv. 883 (2007). Second, to the extent that sufficient salience
could be achieved through encouraging Tiebout, I would not be in favor of such proposals
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There is, however, one promise of the Tiebout model that it
cannot deliver on, and this is its seeming ability to make distribu-
tive choices about local public goods without politics. 7 3 By
"political" choices, I mean choices that are motivated by norms
outside of the Tiebout model (i.e., outside of allocative efficiency
or, relatedly, home value) 74 and made by a non-market process (i.e.,
through voice, not exit). There are two related ways in which it
could be argued that the Tiebout model dispenses with politics,
and both, I will argue, are incorrect.
First, the strong anti-politics view reasons that if jurisdictional
competition is robust, then jurisdictions are simply responding to
preferences like private actors and, in many cases, as private actors,
and so there is no need for a political process to determine how
much should be spent on local public goods, like schools. In Tie-
bout's original article, there is only a city manager looking after
preference satisfaction, and if the manager miscalculates, the mar-
ket mechanism will correct her mistake (most obviously, people
will leave). If there is robust competition, even the city manager is
largely redundant because developers can essentially build whole
new communities from the ground up and the market will decide
whether they have been successful.7'5 This vision applies most
without different political choices being made of the sort discussed in this Article both to
mitigate the Tiebout dynamic externally and to rechannel it internally.
73. Cf Dennis Epple & Allan Zelenitz, The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions:
Does Tiebout Need Politics?, 89 J. POL. ECON. 1197, 1198 (1981) ("Tiebout's argument thus
appears to imply that the ballot box is unnecessary, that efficient provision of local public
services will arise because residents can vote with their feet.").
74. In this Article, I use the notion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, in which the economic
winners could potentially compensate the economic losers using the additional wealth gen-
erated by the more efficient rule. Cf Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian's Market: The
Economics ofInclusionary Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 25 n.L (1996) (defining
terms, following Posner); see also AM. Soc'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, WINDFALLS FOR WIPE-
OUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 143-44 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J.
Misczynski eds., 1978) [hereinafter WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS]. Fischel clearly believes the
Tiebout model is efficient in this way since, as discussed infra, he would transfer resources
from winning local jurisdictions to losing ones through a transfer mechanism at some
higher level of government.
75. SeeJ. Vernon Henderson, The Tiebout Model: Bring Back the Entrepreneurs, 93 J. POL.
ECON. 248, 259-60 (1985) ("What determines the allocation of the fixed number of com-
munities between the rich and the poor? Land companies will adjust the land use of their
communities until the allocation of rich and poor communities is such that within and
across communities the derived demand for land in housing equals supply at equalized land
prices. As another example, What happens if there are inefficient land companies? With
free entry of entrepreneurs, at the limit inefficient land companies will be bought out and
supplanted by efficient ones."). But see Epple & Zelenitz, supra note 73, at 1199, 1216 ("Al-
though increasing the number of jurisdictions reduces each government's ability to levy
taxes in excess of expenditures, we demonstrate that competition among jurisdictions, even
with very many jurisdictions, is not sufficient to prevent individual governments from pursu-
ing policies which are not in the interests of their residents.... The feature of our model
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obviously to areas with the potential for new communities, but it
also applies to redevelopment projects within communities. All the
city manager and legal background rules have to do is let develop-
ers compete with each other and through this competition a
rejuvenated downtown will look the way citizen-consumers want it
to look.
There is a somewhat less radical argument as to the lack of need
for politics in the context of a Tiebout model, which I will call the
weak anti-political position. The key reason for the concession that
characterizes this position is that the Tiebout model is extreme.
For instance, mobility is not costless, and it is not as if a city man-
ager can be easily disciplined by the market, even if it were
empirically true that bureaucrats do (and should) act as property-
tax maximizers. Thus Fischel incorporates a minimal politics into
his model; this reliance on a minimal politics is the weak anti-
political position. I say "minimal" politics because Fischel's point is
"to show how mercenary concern with property values, especially
that of homeowners, motivates citizens to organize and make per-
sonal sacrifices for such things as public schools and amenable
environments. 7 6 Thus the primary concern of his local politics is
economic and in the limited sense of increasing home value; this
limited politics is what will keep local government on track and,
left alone to interact with a Tiebout dynamic, will also attend (for
the most part) to other normative concerns because citizens will
know they will lose money if they allow their community to deterio-
rate. It follows from even the weaker anti-political stance I am
associating with Fischel that local government rules are primarily
of interest to the extent that they do or do not enable competition
(and hence efficiency); their distributive consequences are irrele-
vant (except to the effect that misguided concern with distribution
undermines their efficiency).7 Such a position seems to underlie
that is primarily responsible for this result is the assumption of fixed jurisdictional bounda-
ries. A government given taxing powers in a jurisdiction with fixed boundaries can exploit
the immobility of land and share in the rents accruing to that land."). My argument is, even
if a Tiebout model has no need for politics (e.g., because of developers, local government
cannot be inefficient for long), the Tiebout model still relies on political decisions (e.g.,
through selecting rules governing development).
76. FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 18; see also id. at 96 ("I submit that Tiebout's neglect of
local government politics requires only modest amendment of his model. In most local
governments one just has to replace Tiebout's invisible municipal managers with the me-
dian-voter model. The median voter will want to do most of the same things that an
entrepreneurial private manager would want to do.").
77. This result also generally follows for those that believe that local regulations them-
selves should be left to the local government market and that central governments should
focus primarily on ensuring that there is adequate competition at the local level. There is,
for instance, a recent thoughtful proposal to allow local governments to compete as to the
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the support for the Mello-Roos bond status quo discussed at the
beginning of this Article. That is, it is perfectly appropriate to give
local governments and developers a new tool to spur development,
but highly inappropriate to dictate that such a tool is only to en-
able smarter development patterns.
I maintain that a robust politics is inherent to the Tiebout
model and that even the weaker Fischel-type position is incorrect.
Specifically, I will argue that there are two ways in which a more
robust politics constrains the Tiebout model, one way I label "ex-
ternal" and one "internal." By external I mean to indicate the
various ways in which creating and sustaining Tiebout-typejurisdic-
tional competition is itself a political choice. I use the adjective
"external" because this constraint explicitly evaluates the Tiebout
model according to non-Tieboutian values.
The second type of constraint, which is the focus of this Article, I
label internal. The internal constraint assumes a functioning Tie-
bout model, but its existence demonstrates that, nevertheless,
within such a model, political choices must be made. At the heart
of the internal political constraint is the following argument,
emerging from Tiebout's original conditions for making his model
efficient. If the Tiebout model is to operate efficiently, then juris-
dictions must achieve economies of scale. Economies of scale
dictate that there will only be a certain number ofjurisdictions and
that certain public goods are likely to be produced together. It is
doubtful that anyone gets just the school and parks she wants; we
all have to compromise. Of the limited sets of bundles possible
given the constraint of economies of scale, there are presumably
multiple sets of second-best bundles that are all equally efficient (at
least for pragmatic purposes). Choosing among these equally effi-
cient sets must be done on some other basis than efficiency. I argue
that one crucial way we make such choices is through our back-
ground legal rules.
level of property protection that they will offer. See Serkin, supra note 72, at 886 ("Creating
different local property regimes allows for a new dimension in Tiebout-style sorting. Satisfy-
ing individual preferences for property regimes will unlock additional property values as
people pay premiums to receive the property protection that they want."). Serkin only con-
siders the normative implications of opening a new arena for Tiebout competition in
passing and concludes that these concerns ought not derail his efficiency-enhancing pro-
posal. See id. at 933.
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A. Politics as External Constraint
The most straightforward way to see jurisdictional competition
as a political choice is to note that one central feature that makes it
efficient, namely the fact that the property tax serves as a price for
local amenities, also prevents (significant) redistribution at the lo-
cal level] 8 Thus advocating a model ofjurisdictional competition is
likely to freeze in place any distributional inequities without inter-
vention from a higher level of government. There is a further
argument that Tiebout competition is very likely to increase the
level of inequality between jurisdictions. Round after round of
Tiebout competition will likely result in more and more precise
sorting in part because people will find others who share ever more
precise tastes, but also in part because the more economically ho-
mogenous a community becomes, the fewer free-riders there will
be. Ever more precise zoning out of free-riders has a likely con-
verse, namely concentrating the "losers" of Tiebout competition. If
one assumes an unequal initial distribution of resources and also
that this inequality to a considerable degree tracks race, then the
seemingly neutral operation of competition will lead to greater and
greater segregation by race and class, which is arguably what we
have witnessed.79 And this is without assuming that many individu-
als actually have a preference for racial or social exclusivity.
Tiebout advocates, like William Fischel, recognize the power of
this external critique and offer the traditional solution. We ought
not to abandon the Tiebout model in the face of these problems,
says Fischel, but we should instead redistribute from a higher level
of government. Fischel specifically proposes a program whereby a
state would pay any school district a higher than average lump-sum
(a "public school supplement") for taking on a poor student, thus
opening wealthier districts to poorer students because these stu-
dents would not be free riders.80 Fischel labels his prescriptions
"tough love" because he recognizes that Tiebout-type localism is
being chipped away at, at least partially, as a reasonable response to
its shortcomings.8'
78. Cf Bankman, supra note 49, at 784.
79. See Yishai Blank, Brown in Jerusalem: A Comparative Look on Race and Ethnicity in Pub-
lic Schools, 38 URB. LAw. 367 (2006) (applying similar insight to Israel and arguing that
jurisdictional competition has increased the gap not only between Israeli Jews and Israeli
Arabs, but among Israeli Jews); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries Of Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1841 (1994) (demonstrating how Tiebout
dynamic overlaid on initial racialized inequality leads to deepening inequality).
80. FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 279-81.
81. Id. at 288-89.
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Thus Tiebout advocates would seem to acknowledge the need to
defend the Tiebout model politically in light of some of its likely
impacts. Yet following Nagel and Murphy (who themselves follow
G.A. Cohen) , how plausible is it to envision homevoters looking
after their private interests at the local government level and then
voting for necessary redistribution at the state and federal level?
More concretely, would Fischel's homevoters agree to his school
finance plan? Let us take his proposal to subsidize the school costs
of poorer children. Such a program in California would (conserva-
tively) require $7.5 billion/year or 22% of the current state budget
for K-12 education in California.3 And this is assuming 1) that it
does not cost more on average to educate an underprivileged child
(thereby undermining the value of the subsidy), and that 2) other
communities, because of factors like "peer effects," will not refuse
to take such children at almost any price.84
In addition to its distributive downside, the Tiebout model is not
the only way to control the size of government, which leads to the
observation that not only must the Tiebout model be protected
from majorities alienated by its distributive impacts, but it also has
82. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 70-73 (2002).
83. In California, "[a]cross all funds, the difference in total expenditures in a
district at the 25th percentile of spending and a district at the 75th percentile of student-
weighted spending is more than $3,000 per student." SUSANNA LOEB ET AL., DISTRICT
DOLLARS: PAINTING A PICTURE OF REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES IN CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOL
DISTRICTS 1 (2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://irepp.stanford.edu/documents/GDF/STUDIES/05-Loeb-SACS/5-
Loeb-SACS(3-07).pdf. There are about six million students in California. Thus, giving a
grant to the least privileged 25% of students by student expenditure (i.e., 1,500,000 stu-
dents) that would bring them to the level of the top 75% (namely $3,000) would cost $4.5
billion per year. Butjust equalizing the spending is not likely to be enough to induce wealth-
ier school districts to accept these students, which is why my rough calculation above is
based on a $5,000/student grant, which required $7.5 billion/year or 22% of California's
total education spending of $33 billion in 2005-06. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE,
2006--07: OVERVIEW OF THE GOVERNOR'S BUDGET 9 (2006) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2006/budgetov/
2006-07_budget-ov.pdf. About half of California's students are in the free or reduced lunch
program. Note that it is already the case that many of the poorest districts spend more on
average per pupil, LOEB ET AL., supra, at 34-35, and this suggests the limited efficacy of a
simple grant. The wealthiest districts in California, which receive very little state aid, spend
about 40% (about $4,000) more per pupil than average and 107% more on capital outlay.
Id. at 54-55. The differential in capital outlay is partially explained by the rules for public
school construction, as discussed infra.
84. The existence of peer effects is generally accepted. See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, On
Local Finance and the Tiebout Model 71 AM. ECON. REV. 93, 95-97 (1981). The existence of
peer effects creates its own riddles. Suppose, as makes sense and seems to be the case, see id.,
that stronger students do better when surrounded by only other strong students, but that all
students do better still when there is a smattering of strong students dispersed among them.
This means that the whole group benefits more from dispersion, but individuals more from
homogeneity.
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a peculiar relationship with its "friends."5' One leading way of con-
trolling the size of local government, pioneered in California, is
simply to cut property taxes permanently and, in particular, to
sever the property tax from home value. This is largely what Propo-
sition 13 has done. As Fischel notes, such undermining of the
property tax weakens the Tiebout dynamic because it weakens the
ability of the property tax to act as a price8 6 It would be strange to
characterize Proposition 13 as a conscious choice by Californians
to move away from Tiebout and towards centralization, particularly
of education, though that is what has happened. It seems more apt,
to the extent that Proposition 13 truly did express a conservative
hostility to government, to view Proposition 13 as expressing a hos-
tility to government services, even if provided at an efficient level.
After all, a functioning Tiebout dynamic will provide at least the
services that people want, but there is no rule that there cannot be
a disconnect between what people want and what they are willing
to pay for.
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85. I am not the only one to note the difference between "fiscal conservatives" (i.e.,
those who fear Leviathan, such as Buchanan) and those who embrace Tiebout directly (such
as Fischel). Cf Eric J. Brunner & Jon Sonstelie, California's School Finance Reform: An Experi-
ment in Fiscal Federalism, in TIEBOUT AT Fivrxy, supra note 48, at 55, 88-90 (distinguishing
advocates of decentralized government from fiscal conservatives); see also FISCHEL, supra
note 39, at 108.
86. Fischel explains the turn away from Tiebout as caused by the fact that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court had already undermined Tiebout by mandating school finance
equalization. FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 111-18. That is, if local property taxes were not
going to go towards local schools, then Californians decided that they would simply not pay
property taxes. This sweeping hypothesis is controversial and I am convinced goes too far.
See Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition
13?, 50 UCLA L. REv. 801, 830 (2003) ("On the whole, our swing model suggests that the
cause for any voter shift between 1972 and 1978 lies not in school finance reform, but in a
combination of the 'revolt of the haves' (not defined in terms of property wealth, but rather
income) and the problem, well recognized at the time of Prop 13's passage, of seniors get-
ting priced out of their homes by soaring tax bills."). But see William A. Fischel, Did John
Serrano Vote for Proposition 13? A Reply to Stark and Zasloffs "Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did
Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?", 51 UCLA L. REv. 887, 887 (2004) (responding to Stark
and Zasloff); see also Isaac Martin, Does School Finance Litigation Cause Taxpayer Revolt ? Serrano
and Proposition 13, 40 LAW & Soc'" REv. 525 (2006) (critiquing Fischel). There is a large
literature trying to explain the advent and persistence of statewide tax limitation regimes that
constrain local taxes when local taxes could presumably simply have been controlled by local
voters themselves. See generally Jacob L. Vigdor, Other People's Taxes: Nonresident Voters and
Statewide Limitation of Local Government, 47 J.L. & ECON. 453 (2004) (surveying explanations,
including that local voters do not believe they can control their local governments and that
voters are voting for statewide provisions of certain services, but concluding the best expla-
nation, analyzing Massachusetts's Proposition 2 , is that voters were seeking to limit taxes in
otherjurisdictions).
87. This arguably explains the advent of "welcome stranger"-type taxation. A related
argument, made for instance by Miller, is that Proposition 13 was regressive, allowing wealth-
ier citizens to enjoy valuable property, low taxes and reasonable services while the lower
income people essential for providing the services have to make do with inadequate services
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It is crucial to note that a very persuasive new book by Isaac Mar-
tin on the subject of the property tax revolts of the 1970s concludes
that they were largely a progressive phenomenon and that their
primary goal was the maintaining of property tax privileges that
worked as a kind of social insurance . That is, according to Martin,
property values, particularly for homeowners, were typically as-
sessed at a fraction of their true market value.8 In fact, the primary
means by which this privilege was applied was through copying the
old assessment roll year after year.9 This meant that the longer one
stayed in one's home, the more valuable the privilege, assuming
generally rising property values. This informal privilege was gener-
ally not only helpful to the least wealthy homeowners, but helped
shield all homeowners from the market. This analysis suggests that
1) at least to the extent that the Tiebout model requires the prop-
erty tax to reflect market prices, the model has rarely obtained,
and 2) voters are rather unlikely to embrace such a model, espe-
cially if the way to a Tiebout paradise is through a series of
property tax-related income shocks.
Yet even if there were a stable political majority prepared to vote
to create and sustain the Tiebout model, likely with social insur-
ance, and even including sizable redistribution to the less
fortunate, thus mitigating some of the impacts of the model, the
Tiebout model would still likely exact a price in terms of other po-
litical values. To return to Fischel's proposal, it seems more plausible
to envision lots of state and federal dollars being sent to poorer dis-
tricts than poorer students being sent to wealthier districts. This is
especially true if what the Tiebout dynamic has contributed to cre-
ating is ever more segregated communities ever farther away from
one another.92 Possible coercion by federal courts, a stick to go
and high taxes. GARYJ. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCOR-
PORATION 196 (1981). Certainly, this kind of argument is particularly powerful as regards
Proposition 218, passed in California in 1996. This proposition dramatically limited the
ability of local governments to use assessments, which are local levies (e.g., for road paving)
that match benefit to cost and thus are very Tiebout-friendly.
88. ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT PROPERTY TAX REVOLT: How THE
PROPERTY TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS (2008).
89. See id. at 5-13.
90. Id.
91. I discuss these issues in greater detail in Darien Shanske, Book Review, What the
Original Property Tax Revolutionaries Wanted (It is Not What You Think), 1 CAL.J. POL. & POL'Y 1
(2009) (reviewing MARTIN, supra note 88).
92. This goes to the kind of development encouraged by the Tiebout model, namely
sprawl, as Fischel acknowledges. See FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 270-75. Sprawl can be seen as
an external critique of the model to the extent one is valuing the environment and is un-
happy with the model's results. Sprawl can also be seen as an internal problem of the model
to the extent it represents communities avoiding internalizing their true impact, and thus
creating an inefficiency.
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along with the carrot (i.e., money) provided by the central gov-
ernments, is largely barred by Milliken (ban on inter-district
remedies) and even intra-district remedies that take into account
race are now barred by Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seat-
tle School Dist. No. 1. 93 It is precisely because ex post manipulation of
communities is so difficult that I will argue in the following Section
that we must pay special attention to the incentives that are set up
ex ante.
B. Politics as Internal Constraint
We will elaborate and demonstrate the extent to which the Tie-
bout model is constrained internally through political decisions by
starting with Tiebout's original assumptions:
93. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). Parents Involved, though largely driven by its interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, is also a local government decision to the extent that both
sides appeal to different visions of local governments and the Court's prior jurisprudence.
Compare id. at 782 n.30 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Unlike the dissenters, I am unwilling to
delegate my constitutional responsibilities to local school boards and allow them to experi-
ment with race-based decisionmaking on the assumption that their intentions will forever
remain as good as Justice Breyer's.... Indeed, the racial theories endorsed by the Seattle
school board should cause the dissenters to question whether local school boards should be
entrusted with the power to make decisions on the basis of race."), with id. at 866 (Breyer,J.,
dissenting) ("And what of respect for democratic local decisionmaking by States and school
boards? For several decades this Court has rested its public school decisions upon Swann's
basic view that the Constitution grants local school districts a significant degree of leeway
where the inclusive use of race-conscious criteria is at issue. Now localities will have to cope
with the difficult problems they face (including resegregation) deprived of one means they
may find necessary."). Another way to see the local government aspect of this decision is to
note that in this decision the Court has implicitly rejected the ingenious (and appealing)
argument of David Barron that the Court's earlier local government jurisprudence can be
understood as preserving a space for local governments to go beyond the judiciary in en-
forcement of constitutional norms and most especially equality norms. DavidJ. Barron, The
Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. Rjv. 487, 571 (1999)
("Considered in light of Cooley's structural defense of local constitutionalism, and read in
conjunction with the localist turn that Milliken took, Seattle School District may be understood
to rest on a defense of local constitutionalism. The case suggests that, as a matter of federal
constitutional structure, states may not preclude their local political institutions from pro-
moting a norm of constitutional equality that lies beyond direct judicial enforcement. Such
a reading takes Milliken's respect for localism seriously. It reads that respect to rest on the
premise that broad, local remedial discretion is a precondition for federal judicial restraint
in the area of school desegregation."). Of course, in rejecting Barron's synthesis, this leaves
the obvious tension between cases like the first Seattle School District case cited above and
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), on the one hand, which seem to rely on some residual
constitutional import for local government, and cases like Parents Involved, which grants
local governments no special role in advancing equality.
[VOL. 43:3
Above All Else Stop Digging
1. Consumer-voters are fully mobile and will move to
the community where their preference patterns,
which are set,94 are best satisfied.
2. Consumer-voters are assumed to have full knowl-
edge of differences among revenue and
expenditure patterns and to react to these differ-
ences.
3. There are a large number of communities in which
the consumer-voters may choose to live.
4. Restrictions due to employment opportunities are
not considered. It may be assumed that all persons
are living on dividend income.
5. The public services supplied exhibit no external
economies or diseconomies between communi-
ties....
6. For every pattern of community services set by, say, a
city manager who follows the preferences of the
older residents of the community, there is an opti-
mal community size....
7. [C]ommunities below the optimum seek to attract
new residents to lower average costs. Those above
optimum size do just the opposite. Those at an op-
timum try to keep their populations constant.
95
We can understand the internal political constraint as operating
for one of two reasons. The Tiebout model is constrained by poli-
tics both because 1) its extreme assumptions do not obtain, and
because 2) even if a full-blown Tiebout model were to exist, politics
would still be necessary. In terms of the assumptions of the model,
the internal political constraint exists because, for instance, most
people do not live off of dividend income and mobility is costly.
These two facts mean that people are likely to live near their jobs
and are likely to put up with a lot of disappointing amenities once
they have moved to a given location. Because of such factors, there
are going to be a lot of dissatisfied preferences, especially in juris-
dictions that have special locational virtues. Given the likelihood of
many equally inefficient outcomes as concerns jurisdictional organi-
zation, some norms other than simply the satisfaction of
preferences are going to be relevant in designing background rules
94. Note that just as local revenue patterns cannot change, neither can voter prefer-
ences-education, development, whimsy or simple instability of preferences (per the recent
behavioral finance literature) are banished.
95. Tiebout, supra note 29, at 419.
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that will influence the creation and nature of jurisdictions that we
are likely to be stuck with for a long time, even though inefficient.
This conclusion also arises from the nature of a fully functioning
Tiebout model. This is an especially important conclusion because
it indicates that even a maximally efficient Tiebout model contains
normative decisions, and, as noted above, there are a number of
prominent theorists who plausibly argue that jurisdictional compe-
tition has been empirically proven to a considerable degree.
The bundling of amenities is a reasonable solution to the prob-
lem of economies of scale, and economies of scale are essential if a
Tiebout model is to operate efficiently."" It makes sense, for in-
stance, to bundle schools and parks, fire and police services,
various kinds of utility services, etc.9 7 Even to the extent that local
public goods do not enjoy economies of scale when produced to-
gether, the limited nature of space dictates bundling."8 That is,
even though building a school might not contribute any econo-
mies of scale to building a fire station, if several thousand people
have agreed on a school, then they are going to have to agree on
fire protection as well. However, even assuming I have found sev-
eral thousand relatively like-minded people as concerns schooling,
the likelihood of that consensus carrying over equally into fire pro-
tection, zoning, etc. seems remote. Therefore, from within even a
fully functioning Tiebout dynamic, everyone must make compro-
mises. In a top-down model of goods provision, variety is
constrained by the central authorities and whatever decision
method they use. The Tiebout model likely offers more choices,
96. I am focusing on the requirement of achieving scale as imposing some necessary
dissatisfaction of preferences, but, as Tiebout observed from the beginning, there are also
diminishing returns as concerns local public goods. That is, even though I could pay the
price to live in my desired school district, it may already be optimally sized and so I cannot
enter it, or, alternatively, everyone suffers a little to the extent that I am allowed to enter
because the local public good is being over-utilized. Cf Yoo, supra note 27, at 676.
97. Interestingly, in one of his original articles on public goods, Samuelson compared
the challenge they posed to "the case [in private economics] of a bilateral-monopoly sup-
plier of joint products." Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public
Expenditure, 37 Rv. EcoN. & STAT. 350, 355 (1955). A "joint product" is one that shares
some significant portion of its production cost with another, which would seem to be an
accurate description of the relation of many local public goods.
98. Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History ofJurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REv. 843, 844
(1999) ("1 cannot live in San Francisco while paying Los Angeles taxes and receiving Los
Angeles's package of services, nor can I pick and choose among the San Francisco services I
wish to receive and pay for. While economic markets generally resist bundling, the jurisdic-
tional 'market' always bundles."). See generally Lee Ann Fennell, Exclusion's Attraction: Land
Use Controls in Tieboutian Perspective, in TIEBOUT AT Fivry, supra note 48, at 163-98 (develop-
ing the many attributes in the typical bundle purchased by a homeowner, including those
that go beyond local public goods, and thus complicate the Tiebout model, such as social
status).
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and, at any rate, choices seemingly better calibrated to what citizen-
consumers want, but these choices are constrained by what the
market can produce efficiently (that is, if the Tiebout model is to
be efficient).
Economies of scale, and in particular the phenomenon of bun-
dling, indicate that there will only be a limited number of
communities possible in a Tiebout model. In addition, efficiency
will require that the jurisdictions be large enough to contain their
externalities, which is another limit on the number ofjurisdictions.
Again, internalizing externalities will also be an impetus for bun-
dling since a properly sized fire protection district will be
sufficiently large to require parks, police, etc. In fact, it seems likely
that optimally-sized districts for different services will be different
sizes, thus creating still more flexibility. That is, suppose that a
properly sized fire district is much larger than a properly sized
school district-if this is so, then each fire district will represent a
compromise reached by the inhabitants of many school districts,
and there can be many different sets of school districts within, or
partially within, a fire district. Again, given the necessity that all
citizen-consumers compromise their preferences to some extent, it
seems reasonable to surmise that there are multiple sets of compet-
ing jurisdictions that are equally efficient for pragmatic policy
purposes. 9 The set that actually emerges in the world will be par-
tially the result of political choices as to legal background rules.
99. There is a large literature, associated with behavioral finance, which indicates the
difficulty with trying to create a preference calculus to try to distinguish among preferences.
For an extraordinary survey of the problems, see Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology, Political
Theory, and Law: Is Welfarism Possible, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (2004). Kelman's central claim is
that all purportedly neutral tests of well-being smuggle in at least a weak form of perfection-
ism, such as that only more thoughtful preferences really count. Id. at 81-83. For the
purposes of this Article, deciding which preferences are worth more is tantamount to mak-
ing a political decision and so, if Kelman is correct (as I think he is), then deferring to a
precise preference-calculator to maximize efficiency in the local government market is just
to inject political preferences into the mechanism, and not to avoid politics. It is also worth
observing just how incredibly complicated it would be to arrive at any sensible conclusion on
preference maximization except in broad strokes. Consider, for instance, the famous exam-
ple of framing effects. As Kelman puts it: "[S]tudents at a given level of performance have
higher levels of self-esteem at low-quality schools and citizens in more egalitarian communi-
ties report higher levels of well-being than those with the same income in less egalitarian
settings." Id. at 25. Consider this finding concerning student happiness with the finding,
noted supra, that more homogenous settings are better for stronger students, at least aca-
demically, and presumably precisely because they are pushed forward by competition. There
are also very relevant problems with temporal instability, which one presumes is only more
severe in considering preferences in the context of a home one might own for decades. See,
e.g., id. at 79 ("[I] f students are asked to pick what snack they will eat in each class over the
next three weeks, they are more likely to choose different snacks for each week's class than if
they are asked to choose the snack for each day at the beginning of that day's class."). See
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For example, I may want a very specialized school for my child,
focused on the visual arts, and be generally (and idiosyncratically)
hostile to parks (I have allergies). I will not only probably have to
compromise as to the school (say a general arts charter school),
but also as to the parks (there will be some, maybe very many). A
school district with an arts charter school and lots of parks might
well also have large-lot zoning, so that I may pay for more house
than I would ideally want in order to live within a community that
only approximates what I would most prefer in terms of schools
and parks.'00 It is far from obvious that there would be any effi-
ciency loss if I sent my child to a strong urban public school with a
great visual arts program, had to pay for fewer parks, and lived in
an apartment a bit smaller than I would ideally want. Which com-
promise I will choose will to some extent be determined by what
generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075-1126 (2000).
The argument here that only a certain level of precision is possible can also be expressed
in terms of property values (as expressions of preference): there are multiple sets of second-
best jurisdictions that all have the same total property value. In one set, characterized by
deep economic segregation, there are one hundred $1,000,000 homes and one thousand
$100,000 homes. There can also be fifty $500,000 homes, one hundred $200,000 homes, and
950 $135,000 homes, which have the same total value (about $200,000,0000). Such an alter-
native makes sense if one supposes that there are a host of unsatisfied preferences. For
instance, suppose that about half of the people with $1,000,000 homes would prefer a less
expensive home and about fifty people in $100,000 homes would prefer (and can afford) a
more expensive home, but for a variety of reasons found the $1,000,0000 homes
unobtainable or undesirable. One can imagine a path dependent explanation for this first
scenario-say a 100 home enclave had long ago seceded from a larger jurisdiction, cannot
be reannexed and has protected its exclusivity with exclusionary zoning. A more integrated
development scheme allows for different preferences to be satisfied (and frustrated), lower-
ing the value of the most expensive homes, while increasing the value of the least expensive
ones (presumably because they would have greater access to services at a lower price).
100. Astute observers have suggested to me that the Tiebout model itself really amounts
to a kind of social insurance (which makes Martin's observation on property tax privilege
tantamount to a demonstration that individuals want insurance on their insurance). At least
for the players in the game with a certain amount of resources (ability to pay the price of a
policy), the Tiebout model assures that one will at least be able to live in a community that is
not the worst imaginable, even as it is also unlikely that one will get to live in one's ideal
community. From this perspective, the external political constraint becomes the question of
how much it is worth to pay for this kind of insurance in terms of competing values. The
internal political constraint gets into the details of the coverage. There are lots of
second-best solutions that our Tiebout-policy could provide. Currently, it would seem that
our background rules select for more segregation than most would ideally want; we could
instead have background rules that tended to lead to more diversity than most would ideally
want, and, according to at least some norms external to the Tiebout model, it might be
preferable to err on the side of diversity versus exclusion. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Com-
mentary, The Puzzle of the Optimal Social Composition of Neighborhoods, in TIEBOUT AT FIFTY,
supra note 48, at 199-209 (summarizing and seemingly agreeing with literature that has
found suboptimal level of diversity in current communities and acknowledging that even
more diversity might be desired if made possible to the extent that fear of diversity is based
on ignorance).
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set of jurisdictions the legal rules will have a tendency to produce.
Since, by hypothesis, these different sets are all equally efficient,
the choice between these sets cannot be made on efficiency
grounds. Put another way, jurisdictional competition, must, by
definition, occur between second-best jurisdictions, and there are
many sets of second-best jurisdictions to choose from and we do
choose, partially by means of our legal background rules.0 1 It is this
decision between sets of jurisdictions that I am calling the internal
political constraint on the Tiebout model.0 2
A fairly straightforward example of the internal constraint is
provided by differing rules for annexation and secession. Speaking
generally, in the nineteenth century it was harder for a community
to secede and easier for a smaller community to be annexed by a
larger one.13 Such rules contributed to the growth of enormous
cities. In Tiebout terms, such rules frustrated the desires of those
who would have preferred to live in separate, more homogenous
jurisdictions and enabled those who preferred larger, more diverse
cities. It may be that those rules excessively favored those who
101. These rules are likely to be a product of state law, but can also be a matter of fed-
eral law (e.g., the federal tax exemption) or local law (e.g., a zoning ordinance). Even as to
higher level law imposed on local governments, there are different ways for local govern-
ments to compete within these laws (e.g., what kind of exactions to require or projects to
finance), though my emphasis is on the laws themselves because they are more powerful and
more illustrative.
102. My point is similar to, but distinct from, that made by Fennell in connection with
exclusionary zoning: "Coercive governmental action in the form of land use controls struc-
tures Tiebout-style choice; matters are not simply left up to the market." Fennell, supra note
98, at 180 (citations omitted). My point is similar because we both emphasize underlying
political decisions that structure the Tiebout dynamic, with Fennell emphasizing rules in-
volving exclusionary zoning (I will emphasize financing tools). Yet as I understand Fennell,
her emphasis is on the fact that exclusionary zoning undermines the normative appeal of
Tiebout because the jurisdictional map that results from jurisdictional competition locks out
certain consumers. Strictly speaking, the Tiebout model, in its simplicity and brutality, is
supposed to bar consumers from amenities they cannot afford. On this ground, one can
critique the model externally, but I believe instead that Fennell's (very plausible) contention
is that the limits of the model (such as the import of living near where one works in the real
world, concerns over peer effects and social status) has led to excessive bundling, i.e., to the
underproduction of sets of bundles that would be efficient. See, e.g., Dietderich, supra note
74, at 32 (arguing that exclusionary zoning, through, for instance, forcing me to consume
more house than I want, causes inefficiencies because there is a better use for that extra
land); Yoo, supra note 27, at 642 (noting that the provision of impure public goods, such as
local public goods, can range from efficient to market failure). My primary argument is one
step before that of Fennell. That is, even before arguing that we have structured the Tiebout
dynamic to reach inefficient outcomes, we should first acknowledge that even if we have
structured the Tiebout dynamic to reach an efficient outcome, it was one of many, and we
can evaluate the choices we made to reach this particular outcome normatively.
103. See Briffault, supra note 48, at 357-58 (following Kenneth Jackson). Note that the
rules for incorporation were often permissive in the nineteenth century and that there was
already a great deal of political fragmentation. SeeJoN C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: TiH
POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA, 1850-1970 5-31 (1979).
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preferred large cities, meaning that those rules actually led to a less
efficient set of jurisdictions than was possible. But it could also be
the case that such rules simply favored one equally efficient set of
jurisdictions, namely one where those with tastes for diversity were
more often satisfied relative to those with a taste for exclusion.
Sometime this century these default rules switched. It is now easier
for a community to secede and harder for it to be annexed. Obvi-
ously, this enables those with preferences for relative segregation
and, again, this is not necessarily less efficient.1
4
The switch in annexation/secession default rules was only a
small part of the explosion of the American suburbs and this switch
was arguably more an effect than a cause. Changes in society and
especially in technology (such as the advent of the car and the
interstate) were arguably far more important. Nevertheless, the
pro-suburban secession rules were part of a larger package of legal
changes that enabled this pattern of development.1 0 5 We have al-
ready discussed zoning. Without the power to zone out or at least
limit free-riders, the power to secede would have been much less
appealing. And it is important to note that the power to zone is not
an on-off switch; there is a continuum and there can be different
zoning rules with different impacts. The most famous example of a
zoning rule that is not all or nothing is the rule crafted by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in its central Mt. Laurel decision. The rule
the court crafted was:
As a developing municipality, Mount Laurel must, by its land
use regulations, make realistically possible the opportunity for
an appropriate variety and choice of housing for all categories
of people who may desire to live there, of course including
those of low and moderate income. It must permit multifam-
ily housing, without bedroom or similar restrictions, as well as
small dwellings on very small lots, low cost housing of other
types and, in general, high density zoning, without artificial
and unjustifiable minimum requirements as to lot size, build-
104. There are other ways in which the details of annexation/secession rules shape the
local government landscape with dramatic distributional consequences. More flexible seces-
sion rules combined with more rigid annexation rules may have allowed more wealthy areas
to secede with their valuable tax base, but the essentially voluntary nature of annexation has
also allowed both cities and suburbs to avoid annexing poor, often racially-identifiable,
communities on their outskirts. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty,
and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1095 (2008). Much like the Mt. Laurel
zoning rule discussed below, there is no a priori reason why an annexation rule could forbid
such cherry-picking, say through a strong state commission empowered to mandate fair
division of the tax base.
105. See generally TEAFORD, supra note 103, at 76-104.
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ing size and the like, to meet the full panoply of these needs.
Certainly when a municipality zones for industry and com-
merce for local tax benefit purposes, it without question must
zone to permit adequate housing within the means of the
employees involved in such uses. (If planned unit develop-
ments are authorized, one would assume that each must
include a reasonable amount of low and moderate income
housing in its residential "mix," unless opportunity for such
housing has already been realistically provided for elsewhere
in the municipality.) The amount of land removed from resi-
dential use by allocation to industrial and commercial
purposes must be reasonably related to the present and future
potential for such purposes. In other words, such municipali-
ties must zone primarily for the living welfare of people and
not for the benefit of the local tax rate. "
One interpretation of this rule is that the New Jersey Supreme
Court prohibited excessive exclusionary zoning schemes because
they in effect created externalities in neighboring jurisdictions-
exclusionary zoning had actually created inefficiencies. This
passage can also be interpreted as arguing that, as a matter of state
law and its concern for the general welfare, the set of jurisdictions
enabled by zoning should be different (i.e., broader) than the one
that has resulted from strong exclusionary zoning. This alternative
set, characterized by more mixed and diverse communities and
created by a zoning rule mandating some diversity in allowed uses,
is not necessarily less efficient, but it does likely result in different
amenity bundles being produced and thus different preferences
being satisfied. It is choosing strong exclusionary zoning over the
Mt. Laurel rule that represents a political decision, even assuming
that strong exclusionary zoning is neither more nor less efficient.17
106. S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 731-32 (N.J.
1975).
107. Cf Dietderich, supra note 74, at 41 (" [I]nclusionary zoning schemes are not 'gov-
ernment spending programs.' The peculiar genius of inclusionary zoning is that the
government can change the stock of affordable housing and redistribute the wealth of
neighborhoods merely by manipulating the background rules of property. A vast inclusion-
ary program need not spend a public dime."). But see Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham,
"The Economics of Inclusionay Zoning Reclaimed" How Effective are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 471, 499 (2005) (reiterating the traditional argument that inclusionary zoning func-
tions like a tax and depresses the supply of housing and arguing for limiting exclusionary
zoning directly to increase housing supply). Though I agree with his critics that Dietderich
went too far in his enthusiasm for inclusionary zoning (it may not be that effective and is not
costless), I believe that his basic insight about the background rules is correct, as even the
traditional economists who critique Dietderich look to exclusionary zoning rules themselves
as central to the affordable housing crisis.
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An additional celebrated means for using legal technology to
enable more exclusionary sets of jurisdictions is the "Lakewood
Plan." One reason wealthier enclaves had once agreed to annexa-
tion by larger jurisdictions was that, however expensive the larger
municipality's taxes might be, these taxes would still be less than it
would cost the smaller enclave to provide its own services, particu-
larly those like water that involved huge economies of scale. To
some extent, technology drove down some of these costs and en-
abled the explosion of suburbs in the 1950s. But it was also a legal
innovation, namely the ability ofjurisdictions to contract with each
other to provide services.108 Arguably, these changes just required
local insight and political will-all the new city had to do was con-
tract with the county to provide the same services the county used
to provide when the new city was just a piece of unincorporated
county. Still, such contracting could have been forbidden by state
law as undermining the connection between politics, taxes and
government services. Furthermore, in many cases, new municipali-
ties needed to do more than enter into contracts with counties, but
needed to take advantage of the large and growing bestiary of spe-
cial districts and authorities that state law made available. Thus
many such cities could work together and form a water authority
that would have the power to issue bonds secured by water charges.
The ability to form such an authority, much less the authority's
ability to issue bonds (generally double tax-exempt), was not fore-
ordained.
One underlying characteristic of the rules I have so far discussed
as examples is that they are generally most important when com-
munities are started. It is hard to change facts on the ground
pragmatically and legally. In fact, many of these "startup rules"
108. Also, in California, the advent of a statewide sales tax distributed (in part) to the
locality where the transaction occurred enabled small jurisdictions to generate revenue to
pay for their service contracts without raising property taxes or imposing a sales tax that
would put them at a disadvantage relative to other jurisdictions. MILLER, supra note 87, at 21
(the locus classicus on the Lakewood Plan). The role of the sales tax in this context is an
example of a contingent financing rule that has had important effects on the local govern-
ment landscape and represents a political decision to the extent that the Tiebout model
does not require a sales tax of this sort. There could be no sales tax, only a state sales tax, a
regional sales tax or local jurisdictions could decide the costs and benefits of imposing a
local sales tax on their own. If the rule were that each jurisdiction was on its own, then, as
suggested by Miller, this would have discouraged the creation of new jurisdictions at the
margin because they would have been more expensive to create. That is, they would have
required either higher property taxes or sales taxes that were inefficient to some extent
because the higher sales taxes also drove away business to neighboring jurisdictions without
the sales tax (or a lower sales tax). To the extent the sales tax in the typical Lakewood incor-
poration was being paid by residents of neighboring jurisdictions, then these neighboring
jurisdictions were subsidizing the secession of key components of the regional tax base.
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have received considerable critical attention already, though not
necessarily in the manner they are treated here. In the Section that
follows, I will focus on a type of rule that has gotten relatively little
attention: "bundling rules."
1. Bundling Rules
As discussed above, the requirement of communities of optimal
size, or at least approaching optimal size, mandates the bundling
of amenities. A straightforward bundling rule would be the follow-
ing: the state will fund the building of a park next to every new
elementary school that a community builds. There could also be
regulatory bundling rules-say, requiring a certain level and type
of fire protection based on some formula that took into account
both the number of people and their relative dispersion.
Bundling rules relating to schools are particularly important, es-
pecially given precedents like Milliken and Parents Involved °9 that
limit ex post remedies once a development pattern is in place. One
can imagine all kinds of rules regarding the building or rebuilding
of schools. There could be a seemingly neutral rule that tax-
exempt bonds for school facilities require approval by a two-thirds
majority of voters.11 ° This rule is not neutral to the extent that some
communities will have an easier time using this mechanism to raise
money that is subsidized by the federal and state governments
109. Cf Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together
students of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selec-
tion of new schools, drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics
of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty
in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race."
(emphasis added)).
110. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 13A, § (1)(b)(2); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15124 (2002). In
2000, the voters of California approved Proposition 39, which lowered the voting require-
ment for school bonds to 55% if certain conditions are met. Some of these conditions, such
as accountability and audit requirements, are not problematic. CAL. CONST. art. 13A,
§ (1)(b)(3). Some are more so, and in particular that the amount that these bonds can
increase the tax rate is capped at $30/$100,000 of assessed value (per election), which
means, in effect, that the amount of revenue that can be raised by a school district is deter-
mined by its property wealth regardless of whether or not 55% of the voters have approved
the measure. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15268. Put another way, a poorer district may simply be
unable to take advantage of the lower threshold for many projects. This rule reflects a
choice about how easy it will be for various communities to fund new schools. Though the
examples that follow will focus on California because it is the jurisdiction I know best, the
mechanisms at issue-school bonds, developer fees, assessment districts, even Mello-Roos
bonds-are common to most every state. See generally Jeffrey I. Chapman, The Fiscalization of
Land Use: The Increasing Role of Innovative Revenue Raising Instruments to Finance Public Infra-
structure, 12 PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL'Y 551 (2008).
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(because the average parcel of land is worth more). This rule is not
necessarily inefficient, but it likely increases bundling of new
school construction with property tax wealth.' There could just as
easily be a rule lowering the voting requirement in property tax
poor areas, or, what is likely much the same, promising state
matching funds to such areas if they approve bond measures, thus
distributing the federal subsidy differently.' 2 Deciding which rule
to have is a decision about the volume and distribution of local
public goods, and this decision is not made automatically by juris-
dictional competition.
2. School Building Options and a Return to
the Example of Serrano
In order to illustrate how obscure financing rules work to enable
the creation of certain bundles of goods, I will return to the exam-
ple with which we began, the golf-course centered gated
community called Serrano.! 3 Again, for our purposes, what is es-
sential is that Serrano is isolated from public transportation and
features large-lot zoning, a golf course, and highly segregated
schools largely financed through the issuance of Mello-Roos bonds.
These bonds are double-tax exempt and developers can easily use
them to build schools in new communities. This is in contrast to
the usual rules governing school bonds, which require a two-thirds
majority in an existing community. Mello-Roos bonds are a method
of bundling schools not only with new development, and especially
large-lot development (which is better able to afford the additional
tax levy), but also with exclusionary amenities, such as golf courses.
To the extent that Serrano represents the kind of increased seg-
regation and homogenization inherent to the Tiebout dynamic as
citizen-consumers sort themselves ever more precisely, then
111. Importantly, the California Supreme Court struck down such supermajority rules
on (federal) equal protection grounds, only to be overruled by the United States Supreme
Court. See Westbrook v. Mihaly, 471 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1970), vacated, 403 U.S. 915 (1971), re-
manded for reconsideration in the light ofGordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). There are several
points to be noted. First, the California Supreme Court's opinion contains an insightful
analysis of the historical provenance of these supermajority requirements. Second, neither
court addresses the issue that the supermajority rule in question does not just trigger the
spending of funds from the community doing the voting, but also triggers subsidies from
higher levels of government-at least from a policy perspective, this would seem to be highly
relevant. Third, this is yet another way in which decisions of the Supreme Court have been
essential in forming the local government landscape.
112. This would essentially be a form of district power equalization which is in use to
some extent in several states, including, arguably, California.
113. See supra Part I.A.
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Serrano illustrates the external political constraint because it dem-
onstrates the normative costs we incur through embracing the
Tiebout model. If we are unhappy with this pattern of develop-
ment (as I am), then norms outside of the Tiebout model likely
supply the grounds of the critique.'1 4 For present purposes, how-
ever, I wish to emphasize the internal political constraint:
seemingly minor but necessary legal background rules channel the
type of bundling that occurs and hence configure the local gov-
ernment landscape, with significant distributive impact.
The first way that the relative availability of Mello-Roos bonds af-
fects a distributive outcome is through their interaction with the
federal tax system." 5 Mello-Roos bond financing for a school in a
development like Serrano only became possible in 1982. Without
this mechanism, the only way for a developer to build a school be-
fore people moved into a development would be for the developer
to pay for it herself through development impact fees or a devel-
opment agreement. "6 Development impact fees are levied at the
time a building permit is issued." 7 Since the developer would have
to pay these fees upfront, they would be financed at the developer's
cost of capital, which is not a tax-exempt rate."' To the extent that
this additional cost would have made some developments too
114. By norms outside of Tiebout, I mean norms like diversity, fairness, and environ-
mental preservation. As noted before, it is very likely that this type of development has been
subsidized to the point where it actually imposes efficiency losses as well.
115. I focus here on the federal tax exemption. Similar arguments can be made in
terms of the state tax exemption and the federal deduction for state and local taxes. It
should be observed that it is well known that the federal tax subsidy costs the federal gov-
ernment more in taxes given up than the state and local governments benefit from lower
interest payments. SeeJOINT COsM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES RELATED TO
INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE 26-27 (2008). The inefficiency of the exemption makes it all the
more important that it at least be well-targeted.
116. See WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 74, at 115, 136 (noting upfront financing
is often a major challenge for developers).
117. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66000-66009 (2009). The details of the developer fee
law also contains important distributive decisions. For instance, the level of school fees in
California is generally capped, which means that, without the use of some expedient such as
Mello-Roos, the school district will not necessarily be made whole by a new development. See
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65995. Furthermore, it is permissible and common for developer fees
themselves to be financed by Mello-Roos taxes.
118. Developers certainly argue, publicly at least, that the use of tax-exempt bonds
creates a savings that they can (at least in part) pass on to new homeowners. As I argued in
an earlier paper, this is unlikely to be consistently true given the expense of Mello-Roos
financings-the tax-exemption only serves to consistently mask this expense. See, e.g.,
Shanske, supra note 8, at 758. However, the lack of savings does not indicate that there is no
distributive decision being made. I argued that developers use these bonds not because of
the savings but becase the taxes that are used to repay these bonds are not fully capitalized
into home prices by buyers. If this is correct, then Mello-Roos taxes allow developers to
externalize their costs to the significant extent that the tax is not capitalized into the home
price by homebuyers.
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expensive, or a development without a school unmarketable, then
the availability of the federal tax exemption in connection with
bonds of this sort shifts the set of amenity bundles to be produced
towards greater relative exclusion. It should be noted that this is not
just a matter of state law creating this financing mechanism, as the
federal government, certainly by statute and arguably by regulation,
could forbid the use of tax-exempt funds for projects like this.
Another way of illustrating the political choice being made
jointly by local, state and federal governments is to contrast Mello-
Roos bonds with assessment bonds, a financing device common
since the nineteenth century."9 An assessment is a levy on a piece
of land that is proportionate to the benefit that that piece of land
receives. 12 The paradigm project is an assessment levied to pave a
road-one pays only one's share of the road project's cost, perhaps
in proportion to how much of the road fronts your property. As-
sessments act as a price for a good or service and are therefore
consistent with the Tiebout model. Assessments can be used to pay
for the infrastructure of new development, much like a Mello-Roos
tax. Thus, to the extent that one wanted to enable some develop-
ment beyond that provided by impact fees, assessment law would
have been adequate to provide both a tax-exemption and a means
for developers to pass on the upfront costs. 12' However, precisely
because assessment law requires a tight nexus between cost and
benefit, assessments cannot generally be used to build schools.
Furthermore, assessment law itself need not be taken as a given.
In 1980, Donald Shoup proposed a modified version of assessment
financing where the assessment is only due when a home is sold,
thus obviating the cash flow problems caused by assessments.'2 2 The
cash flow problem is caused by the fact that just because one's
119. See generally Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Spe-
cialAssessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 202 (1983).
120. See, e.g., Knox v. City of Orland, 841 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Cal. 1992) (traditional defi-
nition).
121. I have started to research the history of assessment districts. My preliminary re-
search indicates that they are no more expensive than Mello-Roos districts to set up and can
be used for similarly exclusive projects. See, e.g., County of Orange, Cal., Official Statement
Newport Coast Phase IV Assessment District No. 01-1, at 16 (July 17, 2003) (assessment dis-
trict financing for 168 townhouses in Newport Beach California, with prices starting from
the high $500,000s in a gated community with a clubhouse, lap pool, and spa). However,
assessment districts are used far less often than Mello-Roos, and I suspect one key reason is
the greater flexibility offered by Mello-Roos.
122. Donald C. Shoup, Financing Public Investment by Deferred Special Assessment, 33 NAT'L
TAxJ. 413, 413-14 (1980). An additional intriguing possibility is to broaden the possible use
of assessments, for example for regional transportation improvements. See WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS, supra note 74, at 322 (proposing assessments be used to finance "nonlocal im-
provements"). Combining these two innovations, i.e., allowing deferred assessments for
larger projects, would create a potent pro-Tiebout means of funding infrastructure.
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home has increased in value thanks to the assessment does not
mean that one has more income in any given year to pay the as-
sessment.1 2 3 Such a deferral structure could also be used to mitigate
the analogous cash flow problem caused by property taxes in gen-
eral.2 4 As under current law, prepayments would be allowed of
assessments, as would paying one's assessment according to an am-
ortization schedule.2 5 It could be objected that such a structure is
not financially viable since such deferred assessments would need
to be used in most cases to secure bonds that will finance the im-
provement in the first place, but without a predictable cash flow as
security, such bonds could not be issued. However, bonds have
been issued by government entities that have an "expected pay-
ment schedule," with the issuance documents making it clear that
if an expected payment is missed there is no default.126 The risk of
the final payment not occurring until, say, 45 years after the bonds
were issued could be worked into the price of the bonds to begin
with. One way to cut down on the cost of this risk would be to bun-
dle the deferred assessment bonds of many areas.127
And it is not just assessment law that could be changed. Mello-
Roos law could be similarly altered to allow for deferred payments,
thereby encouraging their use in developed areas. It is also possible
to eliminate schools from the list of projects available to be funded,
thus eliminating the subsidy given to suburban development of
schools. A Massachusetts Mello-Roos-type proposal does not
123. This is the classic problem with the property tax in general, one mitigated, accord-
ing to Martin, first by informal tax privileges, and now by property tax limitation measures
such as Proposition 13. See MARTIN, supra note 88.
124. That is, property taxes beyond some trigger, say as a percentage of income, would
only become due when a property is sold (there would be some rate of interest, say tied to the
municipal bond rate). Virginia seems to be on the way to allowing for experimentation with
such a system. See SJ. Res. 354, 2007 Sess. (Va. 2007) (allowing localities to defer up to 20% of
property tax). Since this proposal is a constitutional amendment, it must pass the legislature
one more time and be approved by a majority of voters. SeeVA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
125. Shoup, supra note 122, at 417-20.
126. This is how (loosely) the bonds secured by payments from the Master Tobacco Set-
tlement are structured.
127. At any rate, allowing such bonds, structured somewhat oddly but to advance a pub-
lic purpose, to remain marketable despite these features seems a proper use of the federal
tax exemption. In contrast, I would agree with those who think that the usual effect of the
tax exemption is just to make otherwise marketable and affordable projects a little cheaper
at the cost of a huge aggregate subsidy from the federal government. Though I argue above
that it would be advisable to use assessment-type in existing communities, I acknowledge
that this sort of exercise in direct democracy might be inherently problematic because, for
instance, ballot measures are a take-it-or-leave it proposition put before voters by highly
interested elites. See Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters Make Laws: How
Direct Democracy is Shaping Anmerican Cities, 13 PuB. WORKS MGMT. & POL'Y 39 (2008); Kogan
& McCubbins, supra note 12, at 22 (arguing that "special assessments could increase the
slack between citizen preferences and government policy").
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include schools as a permitted type of project. 18 Mello-Roos bonds
could only be allowed in certain geographic areas to discourage
sprawl; alternatively, Mello-Roos bonds can simply not be allowed
for new developments.
It would also be possible to add to the list of projects that Mello-
Roos bonds can be used for, such as affordable housing. California
law requires that local communities zone for at least a minimal
level of affordable housing. 29 One well-known shortfall of this re-
gime is that it does not have a reliable enforcement mechanism.3 "
That said, the moment of development (or redevelopment) is a
time when the state has powerful leverage to affect development
patterns by providing financing (and to some extent the state al-
ready uses this leverage)."' This suggests that it would be wise to
require that some portion of Mello-Roos financing be used to build
affordable housing.132 However, as noted above, 33 affordable hous-
ing is not a permitted use for Mello-Roos financing, and the
California Governor has vetoed attempts to change this.
To sum up, the case of Serrano illustrates the internal and ex-
ternal political constraints. To begin with the internal constraint,
128. See supra note 10 (defining "Improvement" in Massachusetts House Bill 159).
There is obviously something paradoxical, and almost unsavory, in advocating a reduction in
ways to finance schools. Nevertheless, nothing in this Article has anything to do with the
private building of schools, only with the rules governing the very limited public resources
dedicated to school construction, and from this perspective it is at least arguable that there
could be a net normative improvement across several different registers if different local
financing tools were made available for school construction.
129. California Housing Element Law, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65580-65589.8 (2009).
130. As summarized in a recent (and rather thorough) report:
Two fundamental problems hinder the effectiveness of the housing element law.
First, the law requires local governments to plan for housing, but contains no en-
forcement mechanism. There are few incentives to encourage reluctant communities
to adequately plan and no meaningful consequences when they fail to do so.
Second, the focus of the housing element law is on planning rather than perform-
ance. So even when jurisdictions have plans approved by the State, local communities
do not have to demonstrate that they have done their part to ensure that planned
housing actually gets built. General plans are easily amended to accommodate spe-
cific projects, undermining on a project-by-project basis the long-term housing goals.
LITTLE HOOVER COMM., REBUILDING THE DREAM: SOLVING CALIFORNIA'S AFFORDABLE
HOUSING CRISIS v (2002) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/165/report165.pdf.
131. Id. at 16 ("The vast majority of local funding for affordable housing comes from
redevelopment agencies."). There are also considerable resources directed towards afford-
able housing by the federal and state governments. Id. at 11-16.
132. Cf id. at 24 ("The State should focus on fiscal incentives that would encourage
communities to approve and build multifamily housing, in-fill housing and housing close to
transit centers and jobs.").
133. Seesupra note 22.
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there is simply no good reason to believe that the set of jurisdic-
tions that would have developed in California absent the
availability of Mello-Roos financing would be less efficient than the
set that have resulted with Mello-Roos. There is, relatedly, no good
reason to believe that the set of jurisdictions that would have re-
sulted from a somewhat different Mello-Roos law would have been
less efficient. Mello-Roos law makes it easier to build new schools in
new communities; it could just as well have made it easier to build
solar panels on the roofs of homes in new communities. A differ-
ent kind of bond could have targeted subsidies at infill-pattern
development.
Looked at externally, Serrano would seem to represent the Tie-
bout model leaping into the absurdly inefficient. It seems very
doubtful that this development has internalized the cost of the en-
vironmental degradation associated with this pattern of
development, much less the cost of racial segregation. To be sure,
without government regulation, it is common for private actors to
avoid internalizing the full cost of their actions. Nevertheless, as
has been laid out, these private actions were subsidized by govern-
ment regulation; hence the claim that the Tiebout model did not
slide into the absurdly inefficient, but leapt there, propelled by
government subsidy. And now we not only have many homeowners
who cannot afford their mortgages, but many homes that do not
justify the resources spent in constructing them to begin with.
3. A Note on the Deep Roots of the Appeal of the Tiebout Model
The trip from Samuelson to Tiebout and, as I argue here, back
again to Samuelson and "welfare politics," is a venerable one (and
it is over-determined). As Hirschman has famously argued, econo-
mists tend to favor the neatness of mechanisms that operate by exit
in contrast to the messiness of political systems that operate
through voice. 134 Indeed, Hirschman himsel 35 and J.G.A. Pocock
134. As Hirschman put it, "[exit] is neat-one either exits or one does not; it is imper-
sonal .... The economist tends naturally to think that his mechanism is far more efficient
and is in fact the only one to be taken seriously." ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY 15-16 (1970). As an example of the economist's "blindspot" to voice, Hirschman
notes Milton Friedman's proposal to make it easier for parents to have their children exit
their schools-somehow it is just obvious that this is preferable to parents using voice di-
rectly to change their schools. Id. at 16-17. To be sure, Hirschman notes that political
discourse has been at least as blind to the import and value of exit-it is worth exploring the
political implications of the use of exit precisely because exit is a powerful force and one
that, I think, has a proper place in the local government landscape. Id. at 17.
135. See generaUy ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS (1977).
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have placed the economist's embrace of exit within a larger tradi-
tion of political philosophy in which making decisions through a
political process has always been a source of anxiety. The anxiety
arises, argues Pocock, because in the political realm we are reliant
on one another's virtue. But, as Samuelson noted, we all have an
incentive to shirk our duties as concerns public goods. Even worse,
we all might not agree on the production of public goods, and no
one might be able to bring us all together.
36
This was the ambivalent tradition inherited by the founders,'37
who, at least in the constitutional structure that they eventually
adopted, seemed to abandon the quest for virtue. That is, as noted
above following Gordon Wood, the founders did not create a con-
stitutional order that would rely on the emergence of virtuous
political leaders who could transcend local and narrow interests.
There are only narrow interests that are set against one another.
Yet from within and without the formal structure of the Consti-
tution, there remained concerns that the system could not survive
without a modicum of civic virtue."" For one, the founders re-
mained concerned that the franchise be limited to those who were
arguably economically self-sufficient. 9 Many of the founders, espe-
cially Thomas Jefferson,4 ° continued to use the language of civic
virtue, andJ.G.A. Pocock argues famously and persuasively that the
vast frontier, which seemed to provide an endless opportunity to
create independent yeoman farmers, was seen as a way to sustain a
136. Just because the concern with politics is venerable does not mean it is correct. See,
e.g., Donald Wittman, Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1395 (1989)
(arguing that, at the very least, there is no reason to believe that political markets are less
efficient than economic markets).
137. MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 57, at 407.
138. As Pocock puts it (following Wood), "the Federalists talked both as if virtue was to
be restored and as if it had vanished and must be replaced by new paradigms." Id. at 520. Or
as Wood himself puts it:
[O] ut of the clashing and checking of this diversity [of power and interests] Madison
believed the public good, the true perfection of the whole, would somehow arise.
The impulses and passions would so counteract each other, so neutralize their poten-
cies, as America's religious sects had done, that reason adhering in the natural
aristocracy would be able to assert itself and dominate.
WOOD, supra note 57, at 605-06.
139. Cf MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 57, at 528.
140. Samuel Fleischacker, The Impact on America: Scottish Philosophy and the American
Founding, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 316, 320
(Alexander Broadie ed., 2003). Even thinkers like Adam Smith and James Madison did not
eschew civic virtue. See id. at 328 ("[L]ike Smith, [Madison] sees the liberty that ... gives
rein to 'interest' as compatible with a republic concerned, for the most part, to foster vir-
tue.").
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virtuous citizenry for a long time to come. 141 Indeed, from this per-
spective, with the closing of the frontier, the American embrace of
the homeowner carefully tending his plot and participating in his
local government is arguably just a further refinement of the need
for a kind of supplemental system that creates citizens.
42
Considered from this very broad perspective, this Article is sim-
ply another confirmation that we cannot escape politics and, in
particular, cannot escape debates about how our values are to be
expressed through the creation and allocation of public goods,
even at the local level and even when there is robust jurisdictional
competition. The external political constraint counsels that even if
the austere Tiebout model can deliver efficiency gains in the real
world, we need to decide that these efficiency gains are sufficient
given the costs to other values that a Tiebout dynamic imposes.
One's anti-Tiebout interlocutors in this context might be surpris-
ing, since in many ways small-government anti-tax movements have
done more than anyone else to undermine the Tiebout model.
Second, the internal political constraint counsels that it is inherent
to even a fully functioning Tiebout model that political choices
must be made that will impact which set of local government juris-
dictions we are likely to live in. There is nothing inconsistent with
the Tiebout model in offering a financing mechanism that favors
infill development or to stop offering a financing mechanism that
subsidizes suburban development. The two types of political
constraints are not mutually exclusive. If we select for bundling
141. MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 57, at 533-36; see alo WOOD, supra note 57, at
xii.
142. Of course, it is a matter of dispute just what kind of citizens we are or should be in
the process of creating. As Schragger puts it (in his review of Fischel):
Fischel, however, gives us hints throughout the text that something more than a
hardheadedness about human motivations and a faith in markets animates his glow-
ing portrait of American local government. Fischel is also something of a romantic,
an admirer-as he writes--of the "pluck" of those who set out to create their own
governments, and a believer in the "uniquely American process of bottom-up, local
self-governance" (p. 260). This belief in local "pluck" and an obstinate faith in the ra-
tionality of residential property owners produces the "homevoter"-the new
American freeholder, reimagined as a crusading corporate shareholder in the market
for good government.
This resurgence of the freeholder as the engine of good government should not
come as a complete surprise: the conventional political wisdom that only property
owners could be trusted with self-government lasted well into the twentieth century.
Richard Schragger, Book Review, Consuming Government, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1824, 1856
(2003) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra note 39). As noted earlier, to the extent Fischel's citizens
ought also vote for higher level redistribution, then merely being educated as a homevoter
does not appear to be sufficient.
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rules that edge the set of Tiebout jurisdictions towards greater
equality and diversity, then obviously the Tiebout model is extract-
ing less of a price in terms of these norms.
CONCLUSION: WE CAN DECIDE TO Do BETTER
It is commonly observed that the current economic crisis began
in the American housing market and cannot be resolved until that
market is stabilized. This very sensible intuition must be true to a
considerable extent given that American homes are the largest as-
set of the world's largest group of consumers. To date, most
analyses of the crisis emphasize how shoddy lending practices put
too many Americans into homes they could not afford. There has
been much less consideration as to whether the houses built were
the wrong houses-ones that have had their value slashed partly
because they were overvalued to begin with. It is my contention
that part of the problem we are facing is that we subsidized the
value of houses that were of marginal value by every metric, includ-
ing a simple economic one. Tighter lending regulation will attend
to the incentives of the buyers and lenders, but we also need to at-
tend to the incentives of the builders. For too long, local
government law and its interaction with federal tax law has been
ignored on the theory that local governments should be left alone
to compete for and reach efficient bargains. This needs to stop,
and the first step is to recognize that the local government land-
scape can only very imperfectly be compared to a free and
transparent market for goods and services. At the very least, there
are equally efficient sets ofjurisdictions that can be selected for by
operation of local government law and we should consciously
choose to aim for those that better approximate our norms of so-
cial justice and environmental sustainability. It has turned out that
extreme adherence to the market analogy has pushed us to adopt a
development pattern that is objectively suboptimal-we as a society
have paid more for sprawl pattern development than it is worth.
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